**Supplementary Appendix for "System Justification in Authoritarian Regimes"**

In the article, I analyze data from two original surveys. Survey A is a sample of 1,023 Egyptian adult citizens from YouGov's Egypt panel conducted online in 2025. Survey A was reviewed and approved by Yale University's Institutional Review Board under protocol #2000024060. Survey B is a nationally-representative sample of 2,000 Egyptian adult citizens conducted face-to-face in 2018. Survey B was review and approved by Princeton University's Institutional Review Board under protocol #18265.

**Additional Information on Survey B**

The data analyzed in this paper was generated through an original public opinion survey of a nationally-representative sample of 2,000 Egyptian citizens 18 years and older conducted between November 21 and December 5, 2018. 30 enumerators employed and trained on the instrument by the Egyptian Research and Training Center (*al-Markaz al-Misri lil-Buhuth wa al-Tadrib*), a survey research firm headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, conducted the face-to-face interviews.

Households were selected from the master sample of households maintained by the Central Agency of Public Mobilization and Statistics (*al-Jihaz al-Markazi lil-Ta`bi'a al-`Amma waal-Ihsa, or CAPMAS*) and drawn from the country's most recent census, conducted in 2017. The sample is drawn from 22 of Egypt's 27 governorates. The excluded five districts (New Valley, North Sinai, Matrouh, Red Sea, and South Sinai) are extremely rural, contain only 1.8 percent of the country's population, and its representatives comprised less than 6 percent of the most recently elected representative Egyptian parliament. In addition, the North and South Sinai districts present unique and costly security challenges due to recent turmoil in the area. These give governorates were excluded from the sample due to safety and feasibility concerns, as is standard practice for ERTC and other reputable Egyptian survey firms.

Licensed Egyptian public opinion firms must contact CAPMAS, a major government ministry, to draw samples for surveys, and in doing so there is an unofficial review of the survey instrument. During this review, it was made clear to me through the firm that I would be unable to ask direct questions about support for the current regime using the president's name due to the political climate during which the survey was fielded. However, the indirect questions about support non-democratic government and satisfaction with the performance of the regime, which could theoretically be delinked from the president himself, were permissible and were included.

The sampling employed a multi-stage stratified random probability approach so that every member of the 98.2 percentage of the Egyptian population living in the 22 included governorates had an equal chance of being included. The sample was weighted by governorate population (percent of population living within a given governorate per the 2017 census) and stratified by urbanization (45 percent urban and 55 percent rural per the 2017 census). In Egypt's urban governorates, the district is the smallest local governing unit. Within rural governorates, there exist *marakez* (singular: *markaz*), which are local governing units over groups of villages, and which are equivalent to districts with the difference in name denoting only its rural characteristic. These governorate sub-units are further divided into PSUs, which each contain 12 households.

200 PSUs were randomly selected to cover the target sample of 2000 plus twenty percent more in the case of expected respondents who were unavailable or refused to participate. Within each household, the interviewers employed a standard Kish grid method to select individual participants of alternating genders. The final response rate for the survey was 68.26 percent of those approached as a potential respondent.

Table A1 provides summary statistics for key independent variables and covariates included in the regression analysis. Table A2 presents the key independent and demographic variables by treatment assignment of the survey experiment analyzed in the section titled "Experimental Result," demonstrating that randomization succeeded and did not impact inferences made from the above analyses.

**Table A1.** Summary Statistics for Survey B

| Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| System Justification | 2.27 | .47 | 1 | 4 | 1511 |
| Regime Support | 5.62 | 2.70 | 1 | 11 | 1947 |
| 2011 Revolutionary Protest | .05 | .21 | 0 | 1 | 1977 |
| 2013 Counterrevolutionary Protest | .06 | .23 | 0 | 1 | 1987 |
| Vote in 2011-2012 Elections | .04 | .19 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| Vote in 2014-2016 Elections | .82 | .38 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| Vote in Future Elections | .62 | .48 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| Government Role to Protect Freedoms | 1.52 | 2.09 | 0 | 10 | 1912 |
| Government Violation of Rights Justified | 1.38 | .60 | 1 | 4 | 1867 |
| Support for Islamism | 2.68 | .90 | 1 | 4 | 1848 |
| *Covariates* | | | | | |
| Age | 39.35 | 13.60 | 18 | 88 | 2000 |
| Female | .49 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| Education Level | 3.71 | 1.86 | 1 | 7 | 2000 |
| Economic Stability | 1.99 | .75 | 1 | 4 | 2000 |
| Urban | .43 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |

**Table A2.** Balance Table for Survey B

| Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| System Justification | 2.27 | .47 | 1 | 4 | 1511 |
| *Control* | 2.30 | .46 | 1 | 3.75 | 308 |
| *Treatment 1* | 2.27 | .44 | 1 | 3.66 | 305 |
| *Treatment 2* | 2.25 | .51 | 1 | 4 | 294 |
| *Treatment 3* | 2.29 | .48 | 1 | 3.66 | 301 |
| *Treatment 4* | 2.26 | .46 | 1 | 3.25 | 303 |
| Age | 39.35 | 13.60 | 18 | 88 | 2000 |
| *Control* | 39.84 | 13.56 | 18 | 78 | 400 |
| *Treatment 1* | 38.38 | 13.43 | 18 | 81 | 400 |
| *Treatment 2* | 39.50 | 13.61 | 18 | 88 | 400 |
| *Treatment 3* | 40.08 | 13.45 | 18 | 76 | 400 |
| *Treatment 4* | 38.97 | 13.94 | 18 | 78 | 400 |
| Female | .49 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| *Control* | .50 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 1* | .49 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 2* | .49 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 3* | .57 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 4* | .50 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| Education Level | 3.71 | 1.86 | 1 | 7 | 2000 |
| *Control* | 3.77 | 1.82 | 1 | 7 | 400 |
| *Treatment 1* | 3.78 | 1.83 | 1 | 7 | 400 |
| *Treatment 2* | 3.67 | 1.90 | 1 | 7 | 400 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Treatment 3* | 3.72 | 1.89 | 1 | 7 | 400 |
| *Treatment 4* | 3.63 | 1.88 | 1 | 7 | 400 |
| | | | | | |
| Economic Stability | 1.99 | .75 | 1 | 4 | 2000 |
| *Control* | 2.00 | .78 | 1 | 4 | 400 |
| *Treatment 1* | 2.01 | .73 | 1 | 4 | 400 |
| *Treatment 2* | 1.97 | .76 | 1 | 4 | 400 |
| *Treatment 3* | 2.00 | .75 | 1 | 4 | 400 |
| *Treatment 4* | 1.96 | .73 | 1 | 4 | 400 |
| | | | | | |
| Urban | .43 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 2000 |
| *Control* | .43 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 1* | .44 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 2* | .45 | .50 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 3* | .42 | .49 | 0 | 1 | 400 |
| *Treatment 4* | .43 | .49 | 0 | 1 | 400 |

**Additional Information on Survey A**

I conducted survey A between June 10-16, 2025 with a sample of 1,023 Egyptian adult citizens from YouGov's Egypt panel. The survey was conducted online. The instrument measured individuals' system justification and potentially related dispositions including personality traits, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, need for cognitive closure, and perceptions of a mean and dangerous world through established psychology batteries of questions.

The survey was run in response to a helpful suggestion from an anonymous reviewer that the concept and measurement of system justification needed to be validated in the Egyptian context, and thus warranted an exploration of the dispositional antecedents. The survey was fairly short (less than 10 minutes) and included demographic questions on gender, age, education, income, and religiosity.

Comparing summary statistics from the two surveys (tables A1 and A3), to the extent possible, suggests the second sample is more educated, wealthier, more male on average than the first. However, similarities on the system justification index give me confidence that the second sample is adequate for testing the dispositional antecedents for system justification, as outlined in existing literature.

**Table A3.** Summary Statistics for Survey A

| Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| System Justification | 2.35 | .67 | 1 | 4 | 1023 |
| | | | | | |
| Need for Structure | 5.37 | 1.18 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Need for Closure | 4.01 | 1.22 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| | | | | | |
| Extraversion | 4.01 | .84 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Agreeableness | 4.74 | 1.14 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Conscientiousness | 5.40 | 1.30 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Emotional Stability | 4.44 | 1.23 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Openness | 4.83 | 1.22 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| | | | | | |
| Dangerous World | 4.15 | 1.09 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Death Anxiety | 3.35 | 2.09 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RWA Index | 4.68 | .78 | 1.17 | 7 | 1023 |
| SDO Index | 3.88 | .55 | 2 | 5.67 | 1023 |
| | | | | | |
| *Covariates* | | | | | |
| Female | .40 | .49 | 0 | 1 | 1023 |
| Age Group | 2.15 | 1.01 | 1 | 4 | 1023 |
| Educational Group | 5.69 | .84 | 1 | 7 | 1023 |
| Income Group | 4.09 | 1.13 | 1 | 5 | 625 |
| Religiosity | 2.26 | .58 | 1 | 3 | 917 |

**Table A4.** Survey A Instrument

| Question Wording | Answer options | Variable |
|---|---|---|
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your society?<br><br>1. In general, I find Egyptian society to be fair<br>2. Egyptian society needs to be radically restructured<br>3. Egypt is the best country in the world to live in<br>4. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in Egypt<br>5. Our society is getting worse every year<br>6. Egyptian society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve | 1. Strongly Agree<br>2. Agree<br>3. Disagree<br>4. Strongly disagree | System Justification Index (Reduced) |
| Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.<br><br>I see myself as:<br>1. Extraverted, enthusiastic.<br>2. Critical, quarrelsome.<br>3. Dependable, self-disciplined.<br>4. Anxious, easily upset.<br>5. Open to new experiences, complex.<br>6. Reserved, quiet.<br>7. Sympathetic, warm.<br>8. Disorganized, careless.<br>9. Calm, emotionally stable.<br>10. Conventional, uncreative. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | Big 5 - Personality |
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements?<br><br>1. It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines and movies to keep inappropriate material away from the youth.<br>2. There is no "one right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way.<br>3. Our society must uphold its moral values and traditions to remain strong. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | McFarland (2005) RWA short battery |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4. People should be free to live in a way that reflects their personal values and beliefs.<br>5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.<br>6. The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow. | | |
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements?<br><br>1. Some groups are different and inferior to others.<br>2. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.<br>3. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to make decisions that do not benefit others.<br>4. Society is better off when groups accept their place.<br>5. Some level of social hierarchy is beneficial to society,<br>6. It is ok if better groups are at the top of society.<br>7. Stability in society depends on maintaining clear group boundaries.<br>8. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.<br>9. We should do what we can do to equalize conditions for different groups.<br>10. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.<br>11. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.<br>12. No one group should dominate society. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | SDO (McFarland 2005) |
| Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the statement describes how you see yourself.<br><br>*Preference for Order and Structure* (do not include italicized subheadings)<br>1. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy my life.<br>2. I enjoy having a clear structured mode of life.<br>3. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.<br>4. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.<br><br>*Decisiveness (Tolerance of Ambiguity, Need for Closure)*<br>1. I tend to put off important decisions until the last moment.<br>2. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.<br>3. I would describe myself as indecisive<br>4. I tend to struggle with most decisions. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | Need for Cognitive Closure (Houghton and Grewal 2000) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements?<br>1. I am worried about the safety of my family and friends.<br>2. I feel safe in my neighborhood.<br>3. I believe most people are trustworthy, even strangers. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | Mean World Syndrome |
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements?<br>1. I am not afraid of dying. | 1. Disagree strongly<br>2. Disagree moderately<br>3. Disagree a little<br>4. Neither agree not disagree<br>5. Agree a little<br>6. Agree moderately<br>7. Agree strongly | Death Anxiety |

**Table A5.** Full Regression Results for Table 1 in Main Text

| | OLS Regressions | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Variable | System Justification Index | | | | | |
| Need for Structure | 0.0522*** | | | | | |
| | (0.0179) | | | | | |
| Need for Closure | 0.0505*** | | | | | |
| | (0.0172) | | | | | |
| Extraversion | | 0.0202 | | | | |
| | | (0.0249) | | | | |
| Agreeableness | | 0.0174 | | | | |
| | | (0.0200) | | | | |
| Conscientiousness | | -0.0561*** | | | | |
| | | (0.0187) | | | | |
| Emotional Stability | | 0.120*** | | | | |
| | | (0.0182) | | | | |
| Openness | | -0.00138 | | | | |
| | | (0.0190) | | | | |
| Dangerous World | | | -0.254*** | | | |
| | | | (0.0176) | | | |
| Death Anxiety | | | | -0.0318*** | | |
| | | | | (0.0101) | | |
| RWA Index | | | | | 0.0837*** | |
| | | | | | (0.0264) | |
| SDO Index | | | | | 0.265*** | |
| | | | | | (0.0375) | |
| Female | | | | | | 0.0716 |
| | | | | | | (0.0590) |
| Age Group | | | | | | -0.00429 |
| | | | | | | (0.0283) |
| Educational Group | | | | | | 0.00166 |
| | | | | | | (0.0344) |
| Income Group | | | | | | -0.0329 |
| | | | | | | (0.0252) |
| Religiosity | | | | | | 0.0889* |
| | | | | | | (0.0482) |
| Constant | 1.870*** | 1.964*** | 3.404*** | 2.459*** | 0.932*** | 2.158*** |
| | (0.118) | (0.151) | (0.0755) | (0.0398) | (0.188) | (0.224) |
| Observations | 1,023 | 1,023 | 1,023 | 1,023 | 1,023 | 563 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.015 | 0.043 | 0.168 | 0.009 | 0.055 | 0.004 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Table A6.** Full Regression Results for Table 2 in Main Text

| | Linear Regressions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Variable | Government responsibility to protect freedoms of speech, assembly | | Government violation of human rights justified for national security | |
| System Justification Index | 0.248*** | 0.172*** | 0.197*** | 0.175*** |
| | (0.0410) | (0.0437) | (0.0196) | (0.0210) |
| Age | | 0.00179 | | -0.000741 |
| | | (0.00154) | | (0.000735) |
| Female | | -0.0208 | | -0.00245 |
| | | (0.0395) | | (0.0191) |
| Education | | -0.0535*** | | -0.0183*** |
| | | (0.0114) | | (0.00552) |
| Urban | | 0.00840 | | -.00266 |
| | | (0.0394) | | (0.0190) |
| Economic Stability | | 0.116*** | | 0.0435*** |
| | | (0.0281) | | (0.0135) |
| Constant | 0.106 | 0.189 | -0.202*** | -0.136* |
| | (0.0951) | (0.121) | (0.0455) | (0.0582) |
| Observations | 1,491 | 1,491 | 1,489 | 1,489 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.023 | 0.046 | 0.063 | 0.071 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As I note in the main text, both dependent variables; the skewness for the outcome variable in columns 1 and 2 was 1.26, and 1.46 for the outcome variable in columns 3 and 4. Because the first dependent variable contained 0s in the original coding, I add 10 and then take the log of the variable. For the second dependent variable, I simply take the log. The variables are appropriately retransformed when computing the predicted values reported below.




**Figure A1**. Support for Authoritarianism by Levels of System Justification

(90% confidence intervals)




**Figure A2**. Average Treatment Effects on Each Component of Support for Authoritarianism

(90% confidence intervals)

**Table A7.** Interaction between Threat and System Justification

| | OLS Regressions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Variable | Support for Authoritarianism | Support for Authoritarianism | Support for Authoritarianism | Support for Authoritarianism | Support for Authoritarianism |
| Economic Treatment | 0.0835*** | 0.123*** | 0.122*** | 0.169 | 0.192 |
| | (0.0321) | (0.0348) | (0.0345) | (0.180) | (0.179) |
| Security Treatment | -0.0105 | 0.0150 | 0.00945 | -0.409** | -0.448*** |
| | (0.0326) | (0.0353) | (0.0350) | (0.169) | (0.168) |
| Infrastructure Treatment | 0.0584* | 0.0904** | 0.0867** | -0.227 | -0.209 |
| | (0.0322) | (0.0351) | (0.0348) | (0.174) | (0.172) |
| Identity Treatment | 0.0514 | 0.0747** | 0.0774** | -0.242 | -0.211 |
| | (0.0318) | (0.0345) | (0.0343) | (0.175) | (0.174) |
| System Justification Index | | 0.153*** | 0.174*** | 0.0589 | 0.0819 |
| | | (0.0233) | (0.0249) | (0.0533) | (0.0542) |
| Economic Treatment x System Justification Index | | | | -0.0227 | -0.0327 |
| | | | | (0.0771) | (0.0765) |
| Security Treatment x System Justification Index | | | | 0.185** | 0.200*** |
| | | | | (0.0720) | (0.0715) |
| Infrastructure Treatment x System Justification Index | | | | 0.137* | 0.128* |
| | | | | (0.0737) | (0.0732) |
| Identity Treatment x System Justification Index | | | | 0.138* | 0.125** |
| | | | | (0.0746) | (0.0741) |
| Controls | | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Constant | 0.557*** | 0.180*** | 0.0635 | 0.399*** | 0.268** |
| | (0.0224) | (0.0593) | (0.0734) | (0.126) | (0.131) |
| Observations | 1,609 | 1,342 | 1,342 | 1,342 | 1,342 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.005 | 0.039 | 0.057 | 0.045 | 0.064 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table A8.** Full Regression Results for Table 3 in Main Text

| | OLS Regressions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | (1) Regime Support | (2) Regime Support | (3) Regime Support | (4) Regime Support | (5) Regime Support |
| System Justification Index | 3.313*** | | | 3.184*** | 3.201*** |
| | (0.117) | | | (0.129) | (0.133) |
| Support for Islamism | | -0.181** | | -0.183*** | -0.175*** |
| | | (0.0704) | | (0.0631) | (0.0635) |
| Government Protect Freedoms | | | 0.0435 | | -0.0568** |
| | | | (0.0302) | | (0.0281) |
| Government: Violate HR for NS | | | 0.603*** | | -0.0706 |
| | | | (0.107) | | (0.0993) |
| Age | | | | 0.00210 | 0.00347 |
| | | | | (0.00449) | (0.00456) |
| Female | | | | -0.166 | -0.174 |
| | | | | (0.117) | (0.118) |
| Education | | | | 0.0485 | 0.0494 |
| | | | | (0.0338) | (0.0346) |
| Urban | | | | -0.0199 | -0.0214 |
| | | | | (0.116) | (0.118) |
| Economic Stability | | | | 0.221*** | 0.247*** |
| | | | | (0.0822) | (0.0842) |
| Constant | -1.967*** | 6.111*** | 4.731*** | -1.813*** | -1.789*** |
| | (0.272) | (0.198) | (0.159) | (0.399) | (0.408) |
| Observations | 1,490 | 1,803 | 1,772 | 1,419 | 1,384 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.350 | 0.003 | 0.020 | 0.355 | 0.356 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Additional Information on Political Behavior Outcomes**

To measure protest participation, I analyze two variables. The instrument included questions that asked about protests during different time periods, introducing important variation in the meaning, legality, and cost of protest as detailed in the previous section on the Egypt context. First, respondents were asked whether they participated in protests surrounding the January 2011 revolutionary uprising, and could indicate yes or no. Second, respondents were asked whether they participated in protests surrounding the June-July 2013 counterrevolution, and could indicate yes or no.

To measure voting participation, I analyze three variables resulting from two survey items, one asking about retrospective voting behavior and one about future voting behavior. The first question the respondent to indicate whether or not they had participated in a number of elections: the November 2011-January 2012 parliamentary elections; the June 2012 presidential elections; the May 2014 presidential elections; the October-December 2015 parliamentary elections; and the April 2018 presidential elections. The first variable captures participation in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections or the 2012 presidential elections. The second variable captures participation in the 2014 parliamentary elections or presidential elections in 2015 or 2018.

As I noted in the main text of the manuscript, these events are differently related to support for the regime. I conceive of the 2011 revolutionary protest and 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential elections as anti-regime; the 2011 protests ousted long-serving president Hosni Mubarak and the 2011-2012 multiparty elections were perhaps the most – and perhaps only -- competitive, democratic, and free and fair contests ever held in the country. In contrast, I conceive of the 2013 counterrevolutionary protest, which demanded the removal of a democratically elected president and the intervention of the military into politics, and the 2014-2016 uncontested elections (similar in nature to any elections in the foreseeable future under the current regime), to be pro-regime.

**Table A9.** Full Regression Results for Table 4 in Main Text

| | OLS Regressions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Variable | 2011 Revolutionary Protest | 2013 Counter-Revolutionary Protest | 2011-2012 Elections (Competitive) | 2014-2016 Elections (Non-Competitive) | Vote in Future Elections (Non-Competitive) |
| System Justification | -0.0265** | 0.0290** | -0.0833*** | 0.137*** | 0.247*** |
| Index | (0.0134) | (0.0139) | (0.0123) | (0.0215) | (0.0275) |
| Islamism | 0.00941 | -0.00255 | 0.0411*** | -0.0448*** | -0.00956 |
| | (0.00656) | (0.00683) | (0.00601) | (0.0106) | (0.0135) |
| Age | -0.000289 | 0.000299 | 0.000118 | 0.00502*** | 0.000118 |
| | (0.000466) | (0.000484) | (0.000427) | (0.000751) | (0.000960) |
| Female | -0.0503*** | -0.0412*** | 0.0103 | -0.0390** | -0.0669*** |
| | (0.0121) | (0.0126) | (0.0111) | (0.0195) | (0.0249) |
| Education | 0.00721** | 0.00921** | 0.00479 | 0.0137** | 0.0181** |
| | (0.00350) | (0.00364) | (0.00321) | (0.00563) | (0.00720) |
| Urban | 0.0393*** | 0.0544*** | 0.00819 | -0.0683*** | -0.0468* |
| | (0.0121) | (0.0125) | (0.0111) | (0.0194) | (0.0249) |
| Economic Stability | -0.00144 | 0.00917 | 0.0193** | 0.00546 | 0.0656*** |
| | (0.00851) | (0.00883) | (0.00779) | (0.0137) | (0.0175) |
| Constant | 0.0783* | -0.0747* | 0.0563 | 0.421*** | -0.0673 |
| | (0.0414) | (0.0430) | (0.0380) | (0.0668) | (0.0854) |
| Observations | 1,425 | 1,427 | 1,439 | 1,439 | 1,439 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.023 | 0.028 | 0.060 | 0.088 | 0.095 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Table A10.** Political Behavior, System Justification, and Regime Type Preferences

| | OLS Regressions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Variable | 2011 Revolutionary Protest | 2013 Counter-Revolutionary Protest | 2011-2012 Elections (Competitive) | 2014-2016 Elections (Non-Competitive) | Vote in Future Elections (Non-Competitive) |
| System Justification | -0.0247* | 0.0249* | -0.0790*** | 0.136*** | 0.225*** |
| Index | (0.0141) | (0.0146) | (0.0128) | (0.0223) | (0.0284) |
| Islamism | 0.00958 | -0.00236 | 0.0404*** | -0.0437*** | -0.00767 |
| | (0.00669) | (0.00694) | (0.00609) | (0.0106) | (0.0135) |
| Government Protect | 0.00268 | 0.00939*** | 5.49e-05 | -0.000238 | -0.0167*** |
| | (0.00295) | (0.00306) | (0.00269) | (0.00468) | (0.00597) |
| Government Violate | -0.00945 | 0.000164 | -0.0143 | 0.000550 | 0.0861*** |
| | (0.0104) | (0.0108) | (0.00947) | (0.0165) | (0.0210) |
| Age | -0.000316 | 0.000253 | 9.52e-05 | 0.00504*** | 0.000427 |
| | (0.000480) | (0.000498) | (0.000438) | (0.000760) | (0.000970) |
| Female | -0.0510*** | -0.0412*** | 0.00966 | -0.0339* | -0.0572** |
| | (0.0124) | (0.0129) | (0.0113) | (0.0197) | (0.0251) |
| Education | 0.00739** | 0.0106*** | 0.00455 | 0.0130** | 0.0186** |
| | (0.00363) | (0.00376) | (0.00330) | (0.00574) | (0.00732) |
| Urban | 0.0403*** | 0.0559*** | 0.00632 | -0.0701*** | -0.0501** |
| | (0.0124) | (0.0128) | (0.0113) | (0.0196) | (0.0250) |
| Economic Stability | -0.00273 | 0.00564 | 0.0201** | 0.00408 | 0.0659*** |
| | (0.00883) | (0.00913) | (0.00803) | (0.0140) | (0.0178) |
| Constant | 0.0863** | -0.0781* | 0.0698* | 0.425*** | -0.128 |
| | (0.0429) | (0.0444) | (0.0390) | (0.0679) | (0.0866) |
| Observations | 1,391 | 1,393 | 1,404 | 1,404 | 1,404 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.023 | 0.033 | 0.059 | 0.086 | 0.107 |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

**Preregistration Analysis Plan**
**November 20, 2018**

## Motivation

This project seems to answer the question: does fearmongering rhetoric increase support for authoritarian politics and policies?

The project is motivated by three sets of observations. First, political scientists have documented a global increase in authoritarianism and democratic backsliding in the early twenty-first century, following the "third wave" of democratization (Agh 2013; Bermeao 2016; Brownlee 2017; Diamond 2008, 2015; Greskovits 2015; Kienle 2001; Kopstein 2003; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Serra 2010). However, as previously documented elsewhere (Nugent and Brooke 2018), these studies focus nearly exclusively on the declining democratic quality of institutions and the elite behavior, intentional or unintentional, which contributes to this decline. Absent from this analysis are voters and ordinary citizens, those most affected by increasing authoritarianism. This oversight leaves scholars with little understanding of whether regular citizens support authoritarianism and how their support might facilitate a decline in the democratic quality of a political system.

Second, authoritarian leaders draw from a consistent repertoire of behaviors. In Russia, a key element of Vladimir Putin's legitimation strategy is the cultivation of a macho image; various public relations events have featured the president subduing wild animals, playing sports, and walking around shirtless, displaying a muscular physique. Egypt's military president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has performed hyper-masculinity by using aggressive nationalistic rhetoric to justify undertaking necessary but disruptive economic reforms and limiting civil rights in the name of fighting terrorism. As one commentator writes, "the state of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has no time for what is considered irrational, emotional, and otherwise understood as feminine politics – feminine politics that make a state soft, attached to a utopian but impossible ideal of equality and justice and easily penetrable by others." Comparable dynamics have been associated with the rise of outsider presidential candidate Donald Trump in the United States. During his campaign and his first year in office, Trump's rhetoric and public persona has emphasized his position as a strong businessman, his unwillingness to compromise, and his overt misogyny, traits that allegedly play to his base of white working-class men. Taken as a group, these strongmen leaders actively emphasize male traits, performing stylized masculinity for political gain. Their cultivated image is one of a savior-like paternal figure, who knows best what the country needs and is strong enough to deliver the solution to a variety of economic, political, security, and social threats. In addition, authoritarian leaders undertake comically large public works projects. These projects are costly and highly publicized but fail to benefit a high number of citizens, thwarting traditional clientelism arguments (Lust 2005). Trump has publicly pledged billions of dollars to build a wall between the United States and Mexico, though his efforts have been stalled by Congress. Putin spent nearly $50 billion on the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, while Sisi has pledged $300 billion to build a new capital in the desert.

Third and finally, while the study of public opinion is undergirded by the assumption that given the full set of options, individuals would prefer democratic government, respondents consistently articulate uncoerced support for undemocratic policies and politicians. Institutional explanations for the stability of authoritarianism blame certain configurations of power for the emergence and persistence of undemocratic governance, and suggest that citizens would favor real liberalization and representation given the chance (for example, see Geddes 2005 and Levitsky and Way 2001). This is particularly true of scholarship on the Middle East, where authoritarian governments are exceptionally stable and public support is robust. Research on public opinion in the region began as a rebuttal to the essentialist arguments about Arab or Islamic culture causing the lack of democracy in the Middle East (summarized in Tessler 2011). Both positivist (Blaydes 2010, Brownlee 2007, Masoud 2011) and interpretivist (Bayat 2013; Wedeen 1999) analyses conclude that

while individuals know they must appear to support the regime for their personal safety and falsify their preferences, they also rebel in small, careful, sometimes seemingly apolitical ways.

Yet empirically, significant support for authoritarian politics has been documented, and much of it appears to be sincere. There is both overwhelming support for democracy at a broad level and little support when the concept is broken down into its specific, constituent parts; in cross-national surveys, many countries overwhelming support both a democratic system as well as having a strong leader who does not heed parliament or elections (Inglehart 2003). Support for undemocratic politics increases when respondents are asked about specific authoritarians rather than authoritarianism as an abstract concept. Employing a list experiment to elicit truthful responses, Frye et al. (2015) find that Russians dislike the corrupt Russian government, but adore President Putin. Similarly, Truex and Tavana (2017) use experimental measures of implicit bias to determine that Egyptian citizens legitimately support President el-Sisi at a very high rate. And in the United States, where public attitudes are more readily measured, Trump's popularity has remained high among his core supporters despite a series of political blunders.

I combine these three observations to motivate an answer rooted in political psychology, explaining why and how the average citizen comes to support an authoritarian ruler and undemocratic politics. I theorize the way in which authoritarian behavior and individual characteristics and experience interact to create public support drawing on long-standing psychological theories about the behavioral effects of deeply held ideas regarding authority and power (Adorno et al. 1950; Hetherington and Weiler 2009), fear (Gray 1987; Ruiter, Abraham and Kok 2011), and patriarchal norms (Sidanius et al 1994; 2000, 1995). In short, authoritarians utilize grand displays of strength and fearmongering rhetoric to tap into citizens' fears about a variety of threats. These performances activate the authoritarian aspects of individual personalities. While this process is not activated in *all* citizens, authoritarian rhetoric and behavior has a substantial effect on the majority of the population.

**Study Context**

The study will be conducted on a nationally representative sample of Egyptian citizens over the age of 18. Egypt is an important contemporary case of failed revolution. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in late December 2010, and soon the region witnessed unprecedented mass uprisings against long-serving authoritarian presidents. Demonstrations spread to Egypt beginning on January 25, 2011. 18 days of sustained protest later, on February 11, president Hosni Mubarak resigned after nearly 30 years in office on February 11.

Mubarak's resignation ushered in a flurry of political activity. Elections were held between November 2011 and January 2012 for the National Constituent Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party led the Democratic Alliance to victory with 37.5 percent of votes. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau and a parliamentarian under Mubarak, defeated former Prime Minister and Air Force commander Ahmed Shafiq with 51.7 percent of the vote in a two-man run-off, and was inaugurated as Egypt's first democratically elected president.

Egypt's democratic experiment was short lived. On the one-year anniversary of Morsi's inauguration, the youth group *Tamarod* (Arabic for "Rebellion"), conspicuously aided by elements of Egypt's security apparatus, organized massive anti-Morsi protests. On July 3, 2013, military officers removed Morsi from power, suspended the constitution, and installed an interim government. In the aftermath of the coup, the military began an unprecedented crackdown on the Brotherhood. Within a year, estimates put the number of detained around 40,000 detentions, the majority being Brotherhood members or supporters. In May of 2014 Field Marshall Abdel Fattah El-Sisi garnered approximately 97% of the vote in a presidential election, decisively defeating Nasserist and 2012 candidate for president Hamdeen Sabahi. El-Sisi was reelected in a landslide victory against one hand-picked opponent in April 2018. Throughout this period, el-Sisi has enjoyed extremely high levels of popular support, displayed both in public opinion as well as private behaviors.

**Pre-Registration (using aspredictor.org template)**

1. **Data Collection** Have any data been collected for this study already?

   No, no data have been collected for this study as of 11/20/2018. A pilot of the main instrument is set to begin 11/21/2018.

2. **Hypothesis** What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

   Does fearmongering rhetoric used by authoritarian leaders increase support for non-democratic politics and policies?

3. **Dependent Variables** Describe the key dependent variables(s) specifying how they will be measured

   The instrument asks five sets of post-treatment questions:

   1. In your opinion, which of the following four is the most important challenge facing Egypt today? (randomize order)
      a. Achieving economic stability (if asked: poverty, unemployment, inflation)
      b. Maintaining national security
      c. Improving infrastructure
      d. Solving identity issues
   2. To what extent do you worry that a national [x] crisis will negatively affect you, your family, and people like you?
      a. Economic
      b. Security/terrorism
      c. Infrastructure
      d. Identity
   3. Which of the following two options is closer to your opinion?
      a. "A non-democratic government can be preferable under some circumstances"
      b. "A non-democratic government is never preferable under any circumstances"
   4. Which of the following two options is closer to your opinion?
      a. "During times of crisis, it is important to have a strong leader decide the best policies"
      b. "During times of crisis, it is important to have the people vote to decide the best policies."
   5. To what extent does an [x] crisis justify the violation of human rights to benefit the Egyptian national interest? To a great extent, to a medium extent, to a small extent, not at all, don't know (do not read), refuse (do not read)
      a. Economic
      b. Security/terrorism
      c. Infrastructure
      d. Identity

4. **Conditions** How many and white conditions will participants be assigned to?

   Respondents will be assigned to one of five treatment conditions, in which they receive one of the following sets of texts:

   1. **Control** No text
   2. **Economic Treatment** As you may know, Egypt has experienced a national economic crisis in recent years. Poverty rates have soared, reaching 60% in some governorates, and inflation of

the Egyptian pound rose as high as 35 percent in 2017. Unemployment has remained very high at above 10 percent. In addition, prices for basic commodities such as bread, oil, public transportation, and electricity have nearly doubled. This economic crisis threatens the country.

3. **Terrorism Treatment** As you may know, Egypt has experienced a national security crisis in recent years. Terrorism rates have soared, reaching 1700 attacks in the Sinai, and 225 attacks and 877 civilian fatalities at the national level in 2017. Almost 1000 police officers and soldiers have been killed while fighting extremists and insurgents. In addition, the number of attacks in urban centers has increased dramatically. This security crisis threatens the country.
4. **Infrastructure Treatment** As you may know, Egypt has experienced a national infrastructure crisis in recent years. Infrastructure accidents have soared, reaching 11,098 incidents and 3,747 fatalities related to poor road conditions at the national level in 2017. The number of collapsed buildings due to poor maintenance exceeded one per week. In addition, the number of accidents involving the Egyptian National Railways increased by nearly a third. This infrastructure crisis threatens the country.
5. **Identity Treatment** As you may know, Egypt has experienced a national identity crisis in recent years. Violent sectarian incidents have soared, reaching 77 major attacks in 2017. While recent public opinion data suggests that the majority of the country acknowledges Egypt as a civil-secular state that respects Islamic tenets, as many as one fifth of Egyptians want the government to adopt more strict and literal interpretations of Islam. In addition, the number of Egyptian citizens who use an adjective in their self-description, such as *Muslim* or *Christian* Egyptian, has grown in recent years. This identity crisis threatens the country

5. **Analyses** Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question.

I will run regressions predicting the dependent variables described in question 3, including a binary variable capturing respondent's assigned treatment.

6. **Outliers and Exclusions** Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and you precise rule(s) for excluding observations

I will exclude respondents who drop out of the survey before completing the outcome measurement. I will plan to run secondary analyses both including and excluding those who chose "don't know" and "refuse" as robustness checks.

7. **Sample Size** How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size?

My sample will consist of 2000 respondents. One fifth of the sample, or 400 respondents, will be assigned to each treatment group. Deviations from this number are due to logistical challenges in the field that are beyond my or my survey team's control.

8. **Other** Anything else you would like to preregister? (e.g. secondary analyses, variables collected for explanatory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

**Expectation of results:**

- If the proposed mechanism is at play, I expect that in each treatment, respondents will rank the content of the treatment as the most important issue facing the country (in comparison to respondents in the other treatments and the control). The comparison with the control treatment demonstrates that fearmongering rhetoric cultivates higher level of fear in the issue discussed in the treatment.
- I also expect that respondents in each treatment will report that the treatment issue will more negatively affect her, her family, and people like her (in comparison with respondents in the other

treatments and in the control). The comparison with the control treatment demonstrates that fearmongering rhetoric cultivates higher level of fear in the issue discussed in the treatment.

- I expect that all treatments, support for non-democratic government (as measured in questions 3, 4, and 5) will be significantly higher than in the control. While these policies do not directly prime authoritarian politics as a solution to these various crises, the idea behind the proposed mechanism is that fear will induce greater reliance on non-democratic politics and policies.

**Heterogenous Treatment Effects**

I intend to test whether the following individual attributes (measured pre-treatment) create heterogenous treatment effects across subgroups of respondents.

***Personality Type***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.<br><br>I see myself as:<br><br>11. Extraverted, enthusiastic.<br>12. Critical, quarrelsome.<br>13. Dependable, self-disciplined.<br>14. Anxious, easily upset.<br>15. Open to new experiences, complex.<br>16. Reserved, quiet.<br>17. Sympathetic, warm.<br>18. Disorganized, careless.<br>19. Calm, emotionally stable.<br>20. Conventional, uncreative. | 8. Disagree strongly<br>9. Disagree moderately<br>10. Disagree a little<br>11. Neither agree not disagree<br>12. Agree a little<br>13. Agree moderately<br>1. Agree strongly | Big 5 - Personality |
| Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about parenting. There are a number of different values parents can instill in their children. In your opinion, which is the most important in each of the following pairs?<br><br>a. Is it more important for a child to have independence or respect for elders?<br>b. Is it more important for a child to obedience or self-reliance?<br>c. Is it more important for a child to be considerate or to be well-behaved?<br>d. Is it more important for a child to have curiosity or good manners? | | Authoritarian personality battery |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your society?<br><br>7. In general, I find society to be fair<br>8. In general, the Egyptian political system operates as it should<br>9. Egyptian society needs to be radically restructured (reversed)<br>10. Egypt is the best country in the world to live in<br>11. Most policies serve the greater good in Egypt<br>12. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in Egypt<br>13. Our society is getting worse every year<br>14. Egyptian society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve | 5. Strongly Agree<br>6. Agree<br>7. Disagree<br>8. Strongly disagree<br>9. Don't know (do not read)<br>10. Refused (do not read) | System justification (Jost) |

***Concept of Government and Satisfaction with Government***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Now I'd like to ask you about your satisfaction with political matters in the country.<br><br>To what extent do you think the government is responsible for undertaking policy designed to: (randomize order)<br><br>a. Create employment opportunities<br>b. Narrow the gap between rich and poor<br>c. Provide security and order<br>d. Keep prices down<br>e. Separate religion from politics<br>f. Provide high quality health services and education<br>g. Protect freedom of speech and assembly | 0-10 | Role of government |
| Measuring the extent to which your country is democratic, on a scale from 0-10 with 0 meaning there is no democracy whatsoever and 10 meaning that it is democratic to the greatest extent possible. In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic? | 0-10 | Democracy I |
| Now measuring the extent to which your democracy is suitable for your country, on a scale from 0-10 with 0 meaning that democracy is completely inappropriate for your country and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for your country. To what extent do you think democracy is suitable for your country? | 0-10 | Democracy II |
| To what extent to you agree or disagree with the following statements? (randomize order)<br><br>a. Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak. | 1. Strongly Agree<br>2. Agree<br>3. Disagree<br>4. Strongly disagree | Democracy III |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| b. Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.<br>c. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.<br>d. Democratic systems may have problems but are better than other systems.<br>e. The citizens of Egypt are not prepared for a democratic system. | 5. Don't know (do not read)<br>6. Refused (do not read) | |
| On a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent of your satisfaction with the current government's performance, in which 0 means that you are completely dissatisfied with its performance and 10 means you are completely satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the current government's performance? | 0-10 | Satisfaction with government performance |
| Do you think that things in Egypt are going in the right or wrong direction:<br><br>a. Generally<br>b. In terms of the economy<br>c. In terms of combating terrorists<br>d. In terms of standing up to other countries<br>e. In terms of building and improve infrastructure<br>f. In terms of protesting human rights | 1. Going in the right direction<br>2. In between (do not read)<br>3. Going in the wrong direction<br>4. Don't know (do not read)<br>5. Refused (do not read) | Policy preferences linked to current administration I |

***Partisanship***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The Arab Spring led some demonstrations and rallies in Egypt in 2011. Did you participate in any of these events? | 1. Yes, I did<br>2. No, I did not | 2011 Protest Participation |
| Did you participate in any of the demonstrations and rallies in Egypt in 2013? | 1. Yes, I did on June 30<br>2. Yes, I did after June 30<br><br>3. No, I did not | 2013 Protest Participation |
| For which candidate did you cast a vote? | 1. Al-Sisi<br>2. Musa<br>3. Other<br>4. DK/R (don't read) | Presidential Vote Choice |
| To what extent do you agree with the following statement?<br><br>a. "The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law." | 1. Strongly Agree<br>2. Agree<br>3. Disagree<br>4. Strongly disagree<br>5. Don't know (do not read) | Religious Preferences I |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1. Refused (do not read) | |
| Here is a list of things some people say about Shari'a. Tell me which ones you agree with. Shari'a government means: (randomize order)<br><br>a. A government that provides basic services such as health facilities, schools, garbage collection, and road maintenance.<br>b. A government that does not have corruption at all.<br>c. A government that uses physical punishments such as stoning, cutting off of hands, and whipping, to make sure people obey the law.<br>d. A government that restricts women's role in the public, such as working, attending school, and going out in public.<br><br>Which element is the most important, in your opinion? | 1. Strongly Agree<br>2. Agree<br>3. Disagree<br>4. Strongly disagree<br>5. Don't know (do not read)<br>6. Refused (do not read) | Religious Preference II |
| How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (randomize order)<br><br>a. Religious leaders [INTERVIEWER: IF ASKED IMAMS, PREACHERS, PRIESTS] should not interfere in voters' decisions in elections.<br>b. Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.<br>c. Religious clerics should have influence/final approval/should be consulted over the decisions of government.<br>d. Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-economic life.<br><br>Religious leaders are as likely to be corrupt as non-religious leaders. | 2. Strongly Agree<br>1. Agree<br>2. Disagree<br>3. Strongly disagree<br>4. Don't know (do not read)<br>7. Refused (do not read) | Religious preferences III |

***Patriarchal Views***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Please indicate the extent to which to think the following characteristics are important to be a 'true' or 'ideal' Egyptian man.<br><br>(Randomize order)<br><br>1. Intelligent (f)<br>2. Kind (f) | 1. To a great extent<br>2. To a medium extent<br>3. To a small extent<br>4. Not at all<br>5. Don't know (do not read)<br>6. Refuse (do not read) | Definitions of Egyptian masculinity |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3. Honest (f)<br>4. Friendly (f)<br>5. Understanding (f)<br>6. Independent (m)<br>7. Outgoing (m)<br>8. Ambitious (m)<br>9. Confident (m)<br>10. Industrious (m)<br>11. Persistent or hard-working (never give up easily; m)<br>12. Family oriented (t)<br>13. Religious (t)<br>14. Conservative (t)<br>15. Traditional (t)<br>16. Humble (t)<br>(pick the most important one?) | | |
| Please list five men that you consider to be exemplary Egyptians. | | Egyptian masculinity I (also sec. vs. relig.) |
| To what extent is being masculine important to be considered Egyptian for men? | 1. To a great extent<br>2. To a medium extent<br>3. To a small extent<br>4. Not at all<br>5. Don't know (do not read)<br>6. Refuse (do not read) | Egyptian masculinity II |
| The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicated whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with it<br>a. A woman can become President of Prime Minister<br>b. In general, men are better at political leadership than women.<br>c. University education for males is more important than university education for females.<br>d. It is permissible for a woman to travel abroad by herself.<br>e. Women and men should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce.<br>f. Husbands should have the final say in all decisions concerning the family.<br>g. Women should have the right to pass on citizenship to their children. | 1. Strongly disagree<br>2. Disagree<br>3. Agree<br>4. Strongly Disagree<br>5. DK (don't read)<br>6. Refused (don't read) | Support for Patriarchy |

***Covariates***

I collect the following covariates, and may conduct exploratory analyses to determine whether these characteristics predict different reactions to the treatments:

- Age
- Gender
- Education
- Employment and Income
- Religiosity
- Marital Status
- News Consumption and Internet Usage (Sources and Rates)
- Military service