

Comparative *Shari'a*:  
Measuring Support for Islamism Cross-nationally

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ABSTRACT

Studies testing the relationship between preferences for Islamism and preferences for democracy in the Muslim world are inconclusive, and likely the result of measurement issues. Previously, we introduced a four-question battery measuring conceptions of Islamism and found that responses vary predictably across two components: whether respondents consider a *shari'a*-based government to be one that provides services or one that imposes restrictive Islamic norms. Here, we demonstrate the consistency, generalizability, and utility of the battery through an analysis of 11,849 respondents in 11 Muslim countries. Defining a *shari'a*-based government as one that provides is significantly and positively correlated with support for democracy, while defining it as a government that imposes is negatively correlated with these preferences across the entire sample.

Popular support for Islamism, defined as an ideology that locates political legitimacy in the application of shari'a, has long been a subject of immense interest and intense debate for scholars and practitioners of politics in the Muslim world. A consequential component of this debate is the relationship between individuals' adherence to Islam and support for democratic values and politics. Critics claim an inherent incompatibility between Islam (Kamrava 1998; Gellner 1983; Lewis 1994; Kedourie 1994) and democracy while proponents advocate Islamic tenets as being fully compatible with democratic practices and preferences (Tessler 2015; Ciftci 2021), largely based on different interpretations of Islamic political theology. However, empirical studies using public opinion data from the Muslim world to test the relationship between preferences for a shari'a-based government and preferences for democracy are inconclusive (The World's Muslims 2013; Ciftci 2013; Berger 2019).

Yet rather than being evidence of no correlation or a complex relationship between preferences for Islamism and preferences for democracy, we argue that these inconclusive results are more likely an issue of measurement. The conception of Islamism derives from religion, a discursive tradition that is highly variable and may even be contradictory across individual practitioners (Asad 1986). As such, Islam – like all religions – means different things to different people, and thus so does its politicized version ('Azmah 1993). However, most studies operationalize support for Islamism by asking respondents' support for the implementation of Islamic law generally or for the implementation of specific Islamic tenets or prescriptions. With few exceptions, existing studies fail to capture respondents' interpretation of Islamic law when measuring support for Islamism.

In order to understand whether and how support for Islamism matters for politics, scholars need to first know what respondents think of when they are asked about a shari'a-based government. In a previous piece published in this journal (Fair, Littman, and Nugent 2018), we introduced a four-question battery designed to measure what Islamism and a shari'a-based government means to survey respondents. Using survey data from Pakistan, we found that commonly-held conceptions of shari'a-based government vary in predictable ways across two distinct components of this concept: whether respondents consider a shari'a-based government to be one that provides services and is free of corruption, or one that imposes restrictive Islamic social and legal norms.

In this research note, we demonstrate the consistency, generalizability, and utility of the battery. The Arab Barometer included our battery in its wave 5 instrument, conducted in 2018 and 2019, resulting in a sample of 11,849 respondents in 11 Muslim-majority countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen). We find that defining a shari'a-based government to be one that provides is positively correlated with support for

democracy, while defining it as a government that imposes is negatively correlated with these preferences, and that general support for shari'a is uncorrelated, across the entire sample. As such, we reintroduce this succinct battery as a necessary and useful tool for scholars collecting and analyzing public opinion data and policy preferences related to Islamism in a variety of Muslim-majority contexts.

In the remainder of the note, we first briefly review existing scholarly work on popular support for Islamism, highlighting conceptual components that form the basis of contemporary conceptions of shari'a as well as major measurement issues when these concepts are operationalized on surveys. We then introduce the battery of questions, and turn to our data to demonstrate that the items capture meaningful variation on conceptions for Islamism within sampled populations, in a way that is remarkably consistent across sampled countries. Next, we return to the normative implications that motivate scholarly and policy interest in Islamism. Additional analyses reveal that how respondents construe a shari'a-based governments determines whether their preferences for shari'a are positively correlated with preferences for democracy; those who conceptualize a shari'a-based government as providing are significantly more supportive of democracy, while those who conceptualize a shari'a-based government as imposing are significantly less supportive of democracy. In additional specifications, the inclusion of variables measuring support for a delineated definition of shari'a offer more explanatory power than variables measuring support for shari'a-based government. These results confirm that capturing the meaning of a shari'a-based government in addition to measuring support for it is necessary to accurately assess the way in which preferences related to religion in politics correlates with other political preferences.

## **Measuring Conceptions of Shari'a**

The study of the relationship between Islam and democracy is intricately linked with contemporary geopolitical developments. As the third wave of democracy spread across much of the world, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa remained steadfastly authoritarian. While there were important democratic examples elsewhere in the Muslim world, such as in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and Albania, many scholars and practitioners pointed to Islam as the reason why the Middle East remained undemocratic and an exception to broader global trends. More recently, the failure of democracy to take root in MENA after the 2010-2011 Arab Spring uprisings, and the salience of the religious-secular divide in the ill-fated early elections, constitution drafting processes, and transitional justice attempts during nascent democratic transitions, has continued the debate about the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Proponents of Islamic exceptionalism focus on the incompatibility of Islam's central tenets with democracy – much like earlier literature on the supposed

incompatibility between Catholicism and democracy. One common claim was that by its very nature shari'a, as religious law, was incompatible with the secular law necessary for democracy to take root. The logic of the argument centered on the fact that Islam plays a central role in adherents' lives by shaping not just politics but also prescribing rules for culture and society (Kamrava 1998). In effect, it represents a "blueprint for a social order" which is effectively inescapable (Gellner 1983). Moreover, although countries with a Christian heritage were not immune from this challenge, scholars argued that in Islam there was no equivalent to the concept of "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," which creates a theological basis for the separation of church and state, a key characteristic of modern democracies (Lewis 1994). According to this argument, Islam is inseparable from the state dating back to the earliest days of the religion; the model Islamic state is one under religious leadership, making this system incompatible with rule by the will of the people. As a result, "the ideas of the security of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating groups and associations—all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition" (Kedourie 1994). Because of the theorized outsized influence of Islamic tenets, scholars also pointed to the public at large as a substantial barrier to democracy, due to their adherence to shari'a, preference for rule by religious leaders, and antipathy towards democracy as the rule of the people, all dictated by Islamic law. This revived earlier arguments centered on civic culture, in which populations' values and beliefs were integral to the establishment and flourishing of democracy (Almond and Verba 1989; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Here, scholars argued that Islam did not promote values that created pluralistic preferences among Muslims, most notably the protection of basic civil rights for all citizens, including women and ethnic or religious minorities (Diamond and Morlino 2004).

On the other side of the argument are those scholars and practitioners who believe Islam and democracy are compatible. They put forward scriptural or religious-based counter-arguments such as identifying clear examples where democracy can be accommodated within Islamic ideological discourses; specific instances of egalitarian behavior of the prophet; Islamic concepts that are generally democratic such as the notion of shura (consultative deliberation in decision-making) or the notion of ijihad, which references the continuing ability of religious scholars to interpret religious texts. Many of these studies also observe that preferences for democracy are high in many Muslim countries. Different scholars mobilize a variety of theoretical frameworks to advance their claims about Muslims' taste for democracy, including cultural claims, political economic arguments, theories about modernization, social capital, and arguments about government performance under different regime types, among others (Spierings 2014).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For examples, see inter alia Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2003. *The True Clash of Civilizations*.

For much of its history, the scholarship on the relationship between Islam and democracy was produced without empirical evidence that actually measured Muslims' support for both shari'a-based governments and democracy, instead relying heavily on analysis of religious texts, interpretations, and practices. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars began to test these claims empirically with evidence produced by ambitious individual and collective survey projects run in countries across the Middle East. However, the empirical evidence produced through important and ambitious individual and collective survey work has produced inconclusive evidence on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Overall, scholarship finds a limited or insignificant relationship between variables measuring support for political Islam and those measuring support for democracy (Tessler 2002).

At the same time, rigorous public opinion research revealed that stated support for democracy was amongst the highest in MENA of any region in the world in the early 2000s. Of nine predominantly Muslim countries surveyed by the World Value Survey in its fourth wave (1999-2004), in all but one at least 86 percent expressed support for democracy (Inglehart 2003). Tessler and Gao (2005) find similar results in a broader set of surveys across MENA, with at least 90 percent of citizens favoring democracy in their country. Moreover, in most countries, support for democracy is about evenly divided between those who favor a greater role for religion in politics and those who prefer it to have a lesser role. By implication, there may be a difference in the type of support for democratic system citizens want vis-a-vis the role of religion, but nevertheless it is clear that the vast majority of those who support political Islam also support democracy.

## Measurement Issues

In our review of existing literature, we find that one of the biggest challenges to

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*Foreign Policy*, no. 135, 63–70; Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart. 2012. Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations. *Political Studies* 60, no. 2 (June): 228–251; Mark Tessler. 2002. Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries. *Comparative Politics* 34 (3): 337–354; Khaled Abou El Fadl. 2004. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. In *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*, edited by Khaled Abou El Fadl, 144. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, March; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll. 1996. *Islam and Democracy*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, May; Abdelwahab El-Affendi. 2003. What Is Liberal Islam?: The Elusive Reformation. *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2): 34–39; Abdulaziz Sachedina. 2001. *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism*. New York, United States: Oxford University Press; Steven Ryan Hofmann. 2004. Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility. *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 6 (August): 652–676; Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal. 2008. The Democracy Barometers (Part II): Attitudes in the Arab World. *Journal of Democracy* 19 (1): 97–110; M. Steven Fish. 2002. Islam and Authoritarianism. *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (October): 4–37; Lindsay J. Benstead. 2015. Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country? *Democratization* 22, no. 7 (November): 1183–1208.

conclusively understanding the relationship between support for Islamism and support for democracy is the way in which support for shari'a has been measured in existing studies. In fact, we believe it is the reason for our collective inconclusive findings on the relationship between support for Islamism and support for democracy.

Many scholars rely on cross-national datasets that ask similar questions about respondents' level of support for Islam in politics. For example, a Pew survey asks respondents about the extent to which they want their government to implement shari'a and in which areas, including in penal laws, personal status laws, and inheritance laws (The World's Muslims 2012), while the World Values Survey asks about support for a "greater role of religion in politics" in Muslim countries (Inglehart et al. 2018). Other scholars employ survey questions about the extent to which respondents prefer that shari'a should be the source of law; possible answers range from shari'a being the only source of law to shari'a being considered alongside other religious, secular, and civil sources (Ciftci 2013, 2010; Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019; Dzutsati and Warner 2021; Rheault and Mogahed 2008). Some employ surveys that similarly ask about respondent support for religious influence on the government, but here in the form of a formal role for religious leaders or politicians who hold strong religious beliefs (Driessen 2018; Buckley 2016; Breznau et al. 2011). Still others ask about respondents' beliefs surrounding the creation of shari'a – whether the Qur'an is the literal and direct word of God, or authored by mortals – and whether it is open to interpretation, multiple interpretations, or should be understood literally (Berger 2019). A final set of studies measures respondents' level of agreement that governments or parties (both generally and specific governments/parties) that implement shari'a are normatively good (Moaddel 2006; Davis and Robinson 2006), or choosing to vote for an Islamist party (Wegner and Cavatorta 2019; García-Rivero and Kotzé 2007; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010). We leave aside those studies that operationalize various aspects of religiosity as a proxy for support for Islam in politics, as this erroneously conflates religious behavior with religious beliefs in line with earlier scholarship on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

These are all undoubtedly interesting and potentially important aspects of how religious beliefs may affect those in the political realm. However, these questions do not capture what respondents understand to substantively comprise shari'a. This is arguably the most important aspect of Islam for politics – how adherents understand the concept, what it means to them (particularly in the political realm), and thus what they are supporting when they say they support its implementation or a political actor

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Tessler 2002; Hofmann 2004; Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke. 2006. International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2:1.

advocating for its implementation. In our previous research that has differentiated between aspects of shari'a when asking for support of it, we find a conditional and nuanced relationship between conceptions of shari'a and support for democracy (Fair, Littman, and Nugent 2018; Fair and Patel 2022, 2020). This is in line with an understanding of both Islam specifically and religion more generally that allows for its multifacetedness, meaning that different aspects of it can promote support for democracy while others may diminish it. As with other world religions, there are multiple teachings that could have different implications. For example, Islam has a strong egalitarian emphasis, which might contribute to support for a political system that promotes equality at the ballot box (Ciftci 2013). The importance that Islam provides for providing for the poor through zakat could be translated into a political system that promotes redistribution, which is a common attribute in many democracies (Davis and Robinson 2006). Yet, as with any religion, there are also teachings that may prove more challenging for democratic governance, such as a general social conservatism. Restrictions related to full gender equality, for example, may be inhibitors to democratic development (Ciftci 2013).<sup>3</sup> As such, like any religious traditions, there may be aspects of Islam which foster support for democracy and others that limit support for democracy.

In the next section, we outline the battery which permits scholars to accurately test for a link between Islam and support for democracy and to examine more complex mechanisms that could help resolve the inconclusive empirical findings by allowing for Islamic or Islamist orientations to, in some instances, be a hindrance to democracy while in other instances to be fully compatible with democracy.

## Data and Methods

We explore the relationship between conceptions of shari'a and support for democracy among a nationally representative sample of Arab citizens aged 18 and above surveyed face-to-face by the Arab Barometer in 2018 and 2019.<sup>4</sup> The Arab Barometer asked questions about shari'a to Muslim respondents only, so the analysis is limited to members of this faith within each country. Additionally, our battery was administered to a split sample, meaning only respondents randomly chosen to participate in form B of the survey instrument were asked to answer these questions. As a result, our sample of respondents includes approximately half of the total Muslim

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<sup>3</sup> Countries with other religious traditions have also treated minority groups, including women, as less equal and limited their full engagement in the political system prior to expanding political and voting rights to such groups.

<sup>4</sup> See <https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/> for details on the full survey instrument and sampling.

population sampled in each country. This resulted in the following sample distributed across 11 countries:<sup>5</sup>

Table 1. Survey Respondents by Country		
Country	Total Respondents	Respondents asked <i>shari'a</i> conceptualization questions
Algeria	2322	1167
Egypt	2400	1066
Iraq	2461	1255
Jordan	2400	1196
Lebanon	2400	611
Libya	1962	1010
Morocco	2400	1189
Palestine	2493	1100
Sudan	1758	857
Tunisia	2400	1201
Total	25406	11849

*Key Variables of Interest*

Our first variables of interest capture respondent’s level of agreement with different conceptions of shari’a. This question is not designed to measure the degree to which a historical (or current) example of a government claiming to implement shari’a actually has been in line with these conceptions. Instead, it is intended to capture in the abstract the degree to which a respondent believes that a government implementing shari’a would do so. The full question reads as follows:

Q605a. Here is a list of things some people say about shari’a government. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. A government that provides basic services such as health facilities, schools, garbage collection, road maintenance
2. A government that does not have corruption
3. A government that uses physical punishments to make people obey the law
4. A government that restricts women’s role in public

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<sup>5</sup> Arab Barometer Wave V includes Kuwait, but these questions were not implemented in this country due to restrictions by the relevant authorities.



Each respondent was presented with each of the four statements above, in succession, and asked to choose the level of agreement that best characterized his or her own agreement with the statement: “I strongly agree,” “I agree,” “I disagree,” or “I strongly disagree.” Respondents could also refuse the question or respond with “don’t know,” though the enumerator did not read out these possible responses. In our coding of 1-4, higher responses indicate more agreement, and don’t know/refuse are treated as missing.

We first constructed simple indices from the responses to these four questions. As expected, answers to questions 605A\_1 and 605A\_2, and answers to questions 605A\_3 and 605A\_4, loaded onto the same factor.<sup>6</sup> To generate our index for a “provides” conception of shari’a, we took the mean of respondents’ agreement with questions 605A\_1 and 605A\_2. To generate our “imposes” index, we took the mean of respondents’ agreement with questions 605A\_3 and 605A\_4.

Our next variables of interest measures respondents’ preferences over the extent to which laws governing their country are based on shari’a, which is similar to the type of question typically used by scholars to measure support for shari’a in survey-based research:

- Q605: From your point of view, should the laws of our country...
1. entirely be based on the shari’a;
  2. mostly be based on the shari’a;
  3. equally be based on shari’a and the will of the people;
  4. mostly be based on the will of the people; or
  5. entirely be based on the will of the people?

We code responses to this question such that greater values indicate high levels of support for a system based on shari’a. In other words, high scores indicate strong support for a system based on shari’a, while middle scores indicate a mix of Islam and the will of the people, and lower scores indicate support for a system based exclusively on the will of the people. We treat refusals and non-responses as missing.

Finally, we measure respondents’ preferences for democracy:

Q516. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

4. Democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better

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<sup>6</sup> Chronbach’s alpha for provides index =0.5773, for imposes index = 0.5700. Please see Tables A2 and A3 for factor analysis of these questions.

than other systems.

Again, respondents were asked to choose the level of agreement that best characterized his or her own agreement with the statement: "I strongly agree," "I agree," "I disagree," or "I strongly disagree." In our recoding of the question, greater values indicate higher levels of support for democracy. Refusals and non-responses are coded as missing.

In addition, we include a number of controls in our full model based on existing studies of support for shari'a and political preferences in the Middle East. We first control for a number of demographic characteristics, including age, gender, education, employment status, income insecurity, as well as marital and parental status. We also control for individuals' reported levels of religiosity as measured by the strength of self-identification as a religious person and frequency of individual prayer. In addition, we account for the gender and religious appearance of the enumerator (Blaydes and Gillum 2013) and include country-level fixed effects. All of these attributes have been found in existing studies to have an independent effect on support for religion in politics, and so we attempt to account for these differences by including them in our regressions. The full text of each question from which our measurements are generated is included in the appendix under Variable Descriptions.

### **Cross-national Conceptions of Shari'a**

To begin, we ask: how do Muslim respondents in different countries conceptualize shari'a? There is significant variation across countries in the extent to which respondents agree that a shari'a-based government is defined as one that provides basic services, is without corruption, uses physical punishments to induce compliance, or restricts women's role in public, as demonstrated in figure 1. The graph demonstrates that most respondents understand shari'a to be strongly related to the government's provision of services. In all countries except Lebanon, the median respondent "agrees" with this understanding of shari'a. In Iraq and Yemen, the response is "strongly agree." Lebanon is the only country where most Muslims disagree. Elsewhere, only in Tunisia does at least a quarter of respondents disagree or disagree strongly.

There is greater variation on whether a government under shari'a has corruption. In most countries, the median respondent "agrees" that there is no corruption when shari'a is implemented. However, in Algeria, the median response is "disagree." The perception that there is no corruption under shari'a government is particularly strong in Iraq, Morocco, and Yemen, where the modal response is "strongly agree" while Algerians, Sudanese, Tunisians and Lebanese are far less likely to hold this perception.

Turning to the link between shari'a and the imposition items, there is a far weaker link in the eyes of ordinary Muslims. In all but two countries, the median respondent disagrees that shari'a- government includes the use of physical punishments, with Yemen and Sudan standing out in this regard with the median respondent agreeing. Iraqis, Tunisians, and Libyans are especially likely to say that physical punishments are not a part of shari'a-government. There is greater uniformity across countries on the perception that shari'a-government restricts women in public. In all countries, the median response is "disagree." Yemenis and Sudanese are somewhat more likely to associate shari'a with restrictions on women in public than those in other countries.

Despite broad similarities across countries, there is clear variation in how Muslims across the MENA region understand shari'a. Yemenis in particular are more likely to see all four aspects, including interpretations that both provide and impose, compared with those in other countries. Lebanese Muslims are relatively unlikely to associate any of these definitions with shari'a government compared with those in other countries. Other nuanced differences also exist, including Algerians being the least likely to say government under shari'a is free of corruption while Egyptians are relatively likely to understand shari'a government as imposing physical punishments. In sum, despite general agreement, there are clear country-specific differences across the region.




Figure 1. Perceptions of Shari'a by Country

## Preferences for Shari'a and Democracy

Next, we ask: how do different conceptualizations of a shari'a-based government correlate with support for democracy, and does their inclusion improve our understanding of the relationship between support for shari'a and support for democracy? Table 2 (Support for shari'a, Conceptions of shari'a, and Support for Democracy) includes the results of three analyses we conduct to address this question. The first specification includes the variable measuring support for shari'a-based government, but does not include conceptualization of a shari'a-based government. The second drops support for shari'a and only includes conception of shari'a-based government. Finally, the third includes both support for shari'a and conceptions of shari'a-based government. Further, the results of additional analyses, presented in the appendix in Table A7 (Support for Shari'a, Perceptions of Shari'a (Binned), and Support for Democracy), demonstrate that individual conceptions of shari'a are robust predictors in a number of model specifications, including demographic controls, measurements of religious identification and frequency of prayer, and enumerator effects. This table presents pooled data, but the results in regressions separating the data by individual countries demonstrate the same pattern holds within countries (see Table A4, Table A5, and Table A6 in the appendix).

We interpret the combined results – that support for a shari'a-based government is only significantly correlated with support for democracy when controlling for respondents' conceptions of a shari'a-based government, though conceptions remain significant on their own – to be evidence that measuring respondents' understanding of a shari'a-based government is necessary, either in place of or in addition to measuring respondents' level of support for a shari'a-based government given that respondents have differing understandings of what is meant by shari'a itself.

**Table 2.** Support for *Shari'a*, Perceptions of *Shari'a* (Index), and Support for Democracy

	(1) Democracy Support	(2) Democracy Support	(3) Democracy Support
Support for <i>shari'a</i> as basis of law	0.00881 (0.00588)		-0.0196* (0.00843)
Provides Index		0.165*** (0.0144)	0.171*** (0.0147)
Imposes Index		-0.0444*** (0.0133)	-0.0441*** (0.0134)
Age	0.000504 (0.000507)	0.000530 (0.000713)	0.000729 (0.000721)
Male	-0.0124 (0.0142)	-0.0130 (0.0201)	-0.0161 (0.0202)
Education	0.0298*** (0.00428)	0.0369*** (0.00607)	0.0371*** (0.00612)
Employed	0.0332* (0.0150)	0.0301 (0.0211)	0.0340 (0.0213)
Income Insecure	0.00674 (0.00715)	-0.000283 (0.0100)	-0.00124 (0.0102)
Married	-0.00115 (0.0182)	-0.00955 (0.0254)	-0.0154 (0.0257)
Has Children	0.00639 (0.0165)	0.00956 (0.0231)	0.0116 (0.0234)
Religiosity	0.00891 (0.0109)	0.00301 (0.0153)	0.00814 (0.0157)
Prayer Frequency	0.0283*** (0.00499)	0.0186** (0.00714)	0.0185* (0.00722)
Enumerator Male	-0.0248 (0.0155)	-0.0261 (0.0220)	-0.0185 (0.0222)
Enumerator Rel. Appearance	0.00985 (0.0153)	0.0267 (0.0217)	0.0253 (0.0219)
Constant	2.611*** (0.0476)	2.302*** (0.0848)	2.337*** (0.0869)
Observations	16548	8268	8131
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.042	0.066	0.066

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## Conclusion

For many years scholars have discussed the impact of Muslim religious identity on a number of variables including its relationship with support for democracy. Overall, these findings have been contradictory, partial, or inconclusive. The result has been a mixed set of tentative conclusions, namely that some aspects of Islam and its teachings may increase support for democracy, some may decrease it, while on the whole the effect is not clear. More recently a number of scholars have hypothesized pathways that may help explain such findings, including complex pathways and mechanisms that can help elucidate this finding. What we seek here is a simpler and more easily implemented solution.

We suggest that scholars like Ciftci are correct to disentangle different aspects of Muslim religious identity to seek to explain this complex relationship. In a similar vein, we find that parsing differences in understanding of shari'a - the fundamental blueprint within Islam informing social and political life - has major implications for the relationship between Islam and support for democracy at the individual level. In effect, those who see shari'a as a legal code focused on good governance and providing services for citizens are more supportive of democracy. After all, at least in theory, this is also what democracy is designed to do better than other political systems. For Muslims with this interpretation of shari'a, there is in effect no contradiction with democracy as hypothesized by scholars like Gellner and Kedourie. Instead, shari'a and democracy are in fact seeking similar goals. It follows that those who understand shari'a primarily in these terms would also be supportive of democracy.

On the other hand, those Muslims that understand shari'a as a legal code that implements corporal punishments or restricts the rights of members of women are less supportive of democracy. Logically, this follows from the fact that in a full democracy, citizens would potentially be able to overrule such opinions at the ballot box. Certainly, women may be unlikely to favor greater restrictions on themselves compared with men and be opposed to this point of view if it were put to a vote. As a result, Muslims who interpret shari'a in this manner are likely to be opposed to democracy, which is consistent with what we find in the statistical models presented.

Thus, we advance the literature in an important way. These findings suggest that much of the existing disagreement in the literature boils down to the simple fact that there is not one agreed upon interpretation of shari'a. Our approach is to emphasize four potential aspects of this religious code. There are additional elements that could be queried, but we find that this approach sheds important light on our key variable of interest and contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the link between Islam and democracy, which has been the subject of so much prior debate.

The key advancement in this research note is to clearly demonstrate across a range of country contexts, religious environments, and political systems that the relationship remains robust. Previously, a similar relationship has been demonstrated in Pakistan, but this application extends this insight across many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. As a result, we encourage scholars interested in how Islam affects other variables at the individual-level to think more fully about the different ways shari'a is understood and to incorporate this knowledge into their research design as a way to develop more complete models of political behavior.

Although we focus on how this approach can better elucidate the relationship between Islam and democracy, there is little reason to think that our contribution would be limited to this relationship. Given that we establish that Muslims do not all have the same interpretation of shari'a when they specify their level of support for implementing it, ignoring such differences in scholarly work has likely obfuscated the relationship between support for shari'a and other variables as well. Examining such questions should be the subject of future research, but we highly encourage scholars to take this broader insight and apply it to their models that seek to understand Muslim political behavior at the individual level.

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# Appendix

## Variables Description

### Outcome Variables

#### *Political Values: Overview*

This project explores the relationship between an individual's understanding of *shari'a* law and her political preferences. Following Fair, Littman, and Nugent (2018), the project focuses on support for democracy. This project uses novel data gathered by the Arab Barometer Wave V 2018-2019 survey initiative to measure individuals' preferences regarding democracy. Preferences about democracy are measured by asking respondents to report their agreement with one statement about democracy. The item concerning support for democracy is derived from Arab Barometer Q516, a four-part battery of questions regarding the respondent's beliefs about democracy. To introduce the battery, the enumerator asks, "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" The enumerator then reads four statements related to the effects and desirability of democratic systems. After each statement, the enumerator asks the respondent to choose which of four levels of agreement best corresponds to his or her level of agreement with the statement: "I strongly agree," "I agree," "I disagree," or "I strongly disagree[.]" The measure for support for democracy is derived from prompt Q516\_4, which gauges respondents' levels of agreement with the statement, "Democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems."

#### *Political Values: Base Variables*

Variables are constructed from the answers given to the questions above.

- *supdem*: Flipped response to statement Q516\_4, regarding democracy's superiority to other systems, with 1 indicating the least agreement and 4 indicating the most agreement.

### Independent Variables

#### *Conceptions of Sharia: Overview*

This project theorizes two interpretations or understandings of sharia law. The first, the Provides interpretation, understands sharia government as "a transparent and fair government that provides

for its citizens,” especially through “providing services and security for its citizens” (Fair et al. 2018, 430). The second, the Imposes interpretation, understands sharia government as one that “imposes Islamic social and legal norms” and applies “physical punishments such as whipping, stoning, cutting off of hands, etc.” (Fair et al. 2018, 430). Individuals can adhere to one, both, or neither of these understandings, and adherence across individuals can vary in intensity.

This project uses novel data gathered by the Arab Barometer survey initiative to measure individuals’ adherence to each of these two understandings across nine countries in the Arab world. Adherence is measured by asking the respondent to provide her level of agreement with four statements. The first and second statements correspond to the Provides interpretation of *shari’a*, and the third and fourth statements correspond to the Imposes interpretation of *shari’a*. Responses are ordinal and range from one to four, with one indicating most agreement and four indicating least agreement. The respondent is first asked: “Here is a list of things some people say about *shari’a*. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? *Shari’a* government means:”

Then, each participant is provided each of the four prompts, as follows:

- Q605A\_1: A government that provides basic services such as health facilities, schools, garbage collection, road maintenance.
- Q605A\_2: A government that does not have corruption.
- Q605A\_3: A government that uses physical punishments.
- Q605A\_4: A government that restricts women’s role in the public.

#### *Conceptions of Sharia: Base Variables*

The variables used in the analysis are constructed from the answers to the four sub-parts of Question 605A.

- *d\_ser*: Flipped response to statement A\_1, regarding government provision of services, with one indicating least agreement and four indicating most agreement.
- *d\_cor*: Flipped response to statement A\_2, regarding corruption, with one indicating least agreement and four indicating most agreement.
- *d\_pun*: Flipped response to statement A\_3, regarding the use of physical punishments, with one indicating least agreement and four indicating most agreement.

- *d\_res*: Flipped response to statement A\_4, regarding restrictions on women, with one indicating least agreement and four indicating most agreement.

#### *Conceptions of Sharia: Indices*

Each respondent's self-reported agreement with the four statements outlined above is used to construct two indices, which represent the respondent's adherence to a Provides or an Imposes interpretation of sharia. Each index takes the mean of the flipped ordinal responses to the two prompts associated with the relevant interpretation.

- *d\_pro*: Mean of flipped ordinal responses to Q605A\_1 and Q605A\_2, which evaluate agreement with the statement regarding government provision of services and the statement regarding government corruption, respectively.
- *d\_imp*: Mean of flipped ordinal responses to Q605A\_3 and Q605A\_4, which evaluate agreement with the statement regarding physical punishments and the statement regarding restrictions on women, respectively.

#### *Conceptions of Sharia: Bin Indices*

Respondents are assigned binned Provides and Imposes values based on the value of their Provides index and their Imposes index. A respondent is sorted into an index's "high" group if his or her index value is 3 or above, reflecting an index value associated with an average response of "agree" or "strongly agree" for the two relevant statements. A respondent is sorted into an index's "low" group if his or her index value is 2.5 or below, reflecting an index value associated with an average response of "disagree" or "strongly disagree."

- *hi\_pro*: 1 if a respondent's value for the variable *d\_pro* is 2.5 or above.
- *hi\_imp*: 1 if a respondent's value for the variable *d\_imp* is 2.5 or above.

Respondents are further sorted into quadrants based on values for the variables *hi\_pro* and *hi\_imp*.

- *hipro\_hiimp*: 1 if a respondent's value for both *hi\_pro* and *hi\_imp* indices is 1.
- *lopro\_loimp*: 1 if a respondent's value for both *hi\_pro* and *hi\_imp* indices is 0.
- *hipro\_loimp*: 1 if a respondent's value for the *hi\_pro* index is 1 and value for the *hi\_imp* index is 0.
- *lopro\_hiimp*: 1 if a respondent's value for the *hi\_pro* index is 0 and value for the *hi\_imp* index is 1.

Note that, unless missing data, each respondent must take value 1 on one (and only one) of these bin indices.

**Table A1.** Values for each indicator

		hi_imp	
		0	1
hi_pro	0	lopro_loimp = 1	hopro_hiimp = 1
	1	hipro_loimp = 1	hipro_hiimp = 1

#### *Support for Sharia as Basis of Law: Overview*

This project seeks to measure respondents' normative beliefs about the proper relationship between *shari'a* or Islamic religious law, on the one hand, and state law, on the other. Question Q605, which asks respondents to provide their point of view about the proper balance between religious law and popular will in lawmaking, is used to measure this relationship. First, Question Q605 asks respondents: "From your point of view – should the laws of our country. . ." Then, the respondent is asked to indicate which of five prompts listed by the enumerator is closest to his or her view: "entirely be based on the sharia," "mostly be based on the sharia," "equally be based on sharia and the will of the people," "mostly be based on the will of the people, or;" and "entirely be based on the will of the people?" These questions correspond to an ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to "entirely be based on the sharia" and 5 corresponding to "entirely be based on the will of the people[.]"

#### *Support for Sharia as Basis of Law: Base Variable*

Responses to this question are flipped to create an ordinal variable that captures respondents' support for *shari'a* serving as the basis of law:

- *supsha*: Flipped response to Q506, with 1 indicating most agreement with the proposition that the will of the people should serve as the basis of law, 5 indicating most agreement with the proposition that the *shari'a* should serve as the basis of law, and 3 indicating agreement with the proposition that the law should be based equally on the *shari'a* and the will of the people.

## Controls

This study includes three categories of controls. The first two categories have to do with individual characteristics of respondents. The first category presents basic demographic information about

respondents, including variables like age, gender, and education. The second category presents two variables related to respondents' religious practice. The third category presents variables related to the characteristics of the enumerator who conducted the interview with the respondent.

#### *Individual-Level Variables: Demographic*

- *demage*: This variable provides the age of each respondent. It is built from question Q1001 in the Arab Barometer survey. Raw data included two types of responses: responses given as the age of the respondent in 2019, and responses given as year of birth.
  - For responses given as age, the age given is used without modification.
  - For responses given as date of birth, the data of birth is subtracted from 2019, the year in which responses were collected.
- *demgen*: This variable is an indicator that indicates whether or not the respondent is male. It is built from question Q1002 in the Arab Barometer survey. Raw data codes respondents who identify as male as 1 and respondents who identify as female as 2. The responses are recoded so that 1 indicates that the respondent is male, and 0 indicates that the respondent is female. For the purposes of the project, gender is assumed to be binary.
- *demedu*: This variable is an ordinal variable that corresponds to the maximum educational level the respondent reports attaining. The variable is built from question Q1003, which prompts respondents with seven educational levels. A value of 1 reflects a response of “No formal education,” a value of 2 reflects a response of “Elementary,” a value of 3 reflects a response of “Preparatory/Basic,” a value of 4 reflects a response of “Secondary,” a value of 5 reflects a response of “Mid-level diploma/professional or technical,” a value of 6 reflects a response of “BA,” and a value of 7 reflects a response of “MA and above[.]” Values for *demedu* correspond directly to values in the raw responses to Q1003.
- *dememp*: This variable is an indicator variable that indicates whether or not the respondent is formally employed or self-employed. The variable is built from question Q1005, which prompts respondents with seven possible employment statuses: “Employed,” “Self-Employed,” “Retired,” “A housewife,” “A student,” “Unemployed or looking for work,” and an open-response “Other, specify:[.]” The variable *dememp* takes the value 1 if the respondent answers “Employed” or

“Self-employed” to question Q1005, and takes the value 0 if the respondent answers one of the other 5 responses.

- *demins*: This variable is an ordinal variable that corresponds with one of four possible levels of income insecurity, as provided by the respondent. Values are taken directly from the raw data from question Q1016, which asks respondents: “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your net household income?” then provides four prompts in ascending order of insecurity. A value of 1 reflects the respondent indicating agreement with the prompt “Our net household income covers our expenses and we are able to save[.]” a value of 2 reflects the respondent indicating agreement with the prompt “Our net household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties[.]” a value of 3 reflects the respondent indicating agreement with the prompt “Our household income does not cover our expenses; we face some difficulties[.]” and a value of 4 reflects the respondent indicating agreement with the prompt “Our net household income does not cover our expenses; we face significant difficulties.”
- *demmar*: This variable is an indicator variable that indicates whether the respondent tells the enumerator that they are married. The variable is adapted from question Q1010, which can take one of seven values. First, the interviewer asks the respondent, “What is your current social status?” and then provides six prompts: “Single/Bachelor,” “Engaged,” “Married,” “Divorced,” “Separated,” and “Widowed[.]” A seventh possible answer, “Living with a partner,” is not prompted by the enumerator but has a corresponding number value in the data. A *demmar* value of 1 indicates a response of “Married” to question Q1010, and a value of 0 indicates any other response.
- *demchi*: This variable is an indicator variable that indicates that respondent tells the enumerator that they have children.

#### *Individual-Level Variables: Religion*

This study includes two control variables related to religion. These variables vary across respondents and reflect respondent’s self-reported responses to questions about religious belief and practice.

- *relint*: This variable is an ordinal variable that records each individual respondent’s self-reported degree of religiosity. It is adapted from question Q609, which asks respondents, “In general, you would describe yourself as religious, somewhat religious, or not religious?” Question Q609 codes a “Religious” response as 1, a “Somewhat religious” response as 2, and a “Not religious”



response as 3. The variable *relint* recodes responses so that higher self-reported levels of religiosity correspond with higher values on the ordinal scale: 1 corresponds with a “Not religious” response, 2 corresponds with a “Somewhat religious” response, and 3 corresponds with a “Religious” response. This variable has a high degree of missingness: 103 respondents refused this question, and 344 respondents answered “Don’t Know[.]”

- *relfre*: This variable is an ordinal variable that reflects how often respondents report they pray. Note that this variable does not reflect the precise number of times that respondents pray within a given time period. The variable is adapted from question Q609a. The enumerator asks the respondent, “How often do you pray?” Then, the enumerator provides six prompts: “Never,” “At least once a month,” “Once a week,” “Several times a week,” “Once a day,” “Five times a day[.]” The value of the variable for a particular respondent rises as prayer frequency rises, with respondents assigned 1 if they respond “Never” and respondents assigned 6 if they respond “Five times a day[.]” For each respondent, the variable *relfre* takes the value assigned to the respondent in question Q609A.

#### *Individual-Level Variables: Interviewer Characteristics*

This study includes two control variables related to the characteristics of the enumerators assigned to interview respondents. While variation occurs across enumerators, values for each variable are recorded for each respondent.

- *intgen*: This variable is an indicator that indicates whether or not the enumerator conducting the respondent’s interview is male. Raw data codes enumerators who identify as male as 1 and enumerators who identify as female as 2. The responses are recoded so that 1 indicates that the enumerator is male, and 0 indicates that the enumerator is female. For the purposes of the project, gender is assumed to be binary.
- *intclo*: This variable is an indicator that indicates whether or not the enumerator conducting the respondent’s interview displays visible religious clothing or physical characteristics associated with religious practice. The variable is built from the variable E2009, available only in the raw dataset, that records whether the respondent’s enumerator displays visible religious clothing or a physical characteristic associated with religion and, if so, what kind of clothing or characteristic the enumerator displays. The variable records “hijab,” “niqab,” “beard,” “zabiba,” “none of

the above," or "other." If the respondent's value for variable E2009 corresponds to his or her enumerator displaying hijab, niqab, a beard, a zabiba, or other, then the respondent's value for variable intclo is 1. If the respondent's value for E2009 corresponds with "none of the above," then the respondent's value for variable intclo is 0.

## Factor Analysis

Below are rotated factor loadings for data pooled from all countries, as well as broken down by each of the 11 countries surveyed as part of this project. Note that results from Algeria and Morocco load onto one factor only.

**Method:** Principal-Component Factors

**Rotation:** Orthogonal Varimax (Kaiser off)

**Table A2.** Rotated Factor Loadings, Total

Total		
	Factor 1	Factor 2
Basic Services	.8370298	-.0015399
No Corruption	.8378928	-.0110151
Physical Punishments	.036085	.837436
Restricts Women	-.0489602	.8359397

**Table A3.** Rotated Factor Loadings, By Country

	Algeria		Egypt		Iraq		Jordan	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
Basic Services	.2776787	.119524	.8392424	.8542537	-.0343804	.7944328	.0464853	
No Corruption	.5918314	-.1365667	.8335827	.8500694	-.0671301	.8350081	-.0141363	
Physical Punishments	.7748678	.8772495	-.0054829	-.0768705	.8139904	.186235	.7495807	
Restricts Women	.7844404	.8802708	-.0075863	-.0293979	.8225664	-.1212701	.8032871	
	Lebanon		Libya		Morocco		Palestine	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 2
Basic Services	-.2700124	.6757088	.7901275	-.3172553	.7681664	.8158345	.0537344	
Anti-Corruption	.0771282	.8406406	.7559811	-.4044801	.7831354	.8393026	.0377377	
Physical Punishments	.8681587	-.1115516	.3985169	.682098	-.727846	.1952966	.7774151	
Restricts Women	.8935295	.0374712	.4397449	.6472477	-.7857564	-.0675291	.8357399	
	Sudan		Tunisia		Yemen			
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2		
Basic Services	.4876107	.153591	.0255068	.7863057	.9162309	.0429453		
Anti-Corruption	.0020619	.9842838	-.0082263	.7937534	.9146586	-.0019734		
Physical Punishments	.767453	-.1032915	.842546	.0897907	.1099348	.7946997		
Restricts Women	.776292	.0827179	.847166	-.0723337	-.0579475	.8091323		

## **Country Regressions**

Each of the three tables below presents one of the three specifications presented in Table 2, but with unpooled data. That is, it presents each of the three specifications run on data collected from each of the 11 countries sampled in this project.

**Table A4.** By Country: Specification 1 (Support for Democracy)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Palestine	Sudan	Tunisia	Yemen	Iraq
Age	0.000271 (0.00149)	0.000121 (0.00182)	0.00106 (0.00112)	-0.000735 (0.00116)	0.00149 (0.00156)	-0.00173 (0.00198)	0.00128 (0.00121)	0.00292 (0.00240)	0.00552*** (0.00127)	0.00235 (0.00205)	0.00228 (0.00152)
Male	0.0501 (0.0374)	-0.0807 (0.0418)	-0.0212 (0.0348)	-0.107** (0.0339)	-0.0378 (0.0425)	0.0240 (0.0512)	-0.118** (0.0409)	0.0386 (0.0453)	-0.0215 (0.0396)	-0.386 (0.731)	-0.0630 (0.0420)
Education	0.0407*** (0.0107)	0.0230 (0.0124)	0.0273* (0.0114)	-0.00285 (0.0119)	-0.00157 (0.0131)	0.0845*** (0.0157)	0.0143 (0.0130)	0.0479*** (0.0145)	0.0530*** (0.0109)	0.0324* (0.0138)	0.0241* (0.0123)
Employed	0.0373 (0.0433)	0.0987* (0.0458)	0.0447 (0.0378)	-0.00530 (0.0342)	-0.0205 (0.0354)	-0.179** (0.0575)	0.0995* (0.0429)	0.0140 (0.0499)	0.105** (0.0372)	0.214*** (0.0606)	0.0840 (0.0456)
Income Insecure	-0.0403 (0.0233)	0.146*** (0.0230)	0.00879 (0.0173)	0.0135 (0.0192)	-0.000296 (0.0166)	0.0320 (0.0275)	0.0183 (0.0187)	-0.00251 (0.0227)	-0.0262 (0.0170)	-0.0613* (0.0273)	-0.0415* (0.0196)
Married	-0.0650 (0.0558)	0.0257 (0.0557)	0.0149 (0.0422)	0.0526 (0.0425)	0.0286 (0.0523)	0.00641 (0.0679)	-0.0127 (0.0491)	0.00399 (0.0659)	0.0119 (0.0467)	-0.0207 (0.0617)	0.0213 (0.0584)
Has Children	0.0726 (0.0496)	-0.0837 (0.0485)	0.0249 (0.0373)	0.0489 (0.0401)	0.0264 (0.0533)	0.0739 (0.0653)	-0.0190 (0.0426)	-0.0822 (0.0631)	0.0328 (0.0435)	-0.125* (0.0605)	-0.0221 (0.0561)
Religiosity	0.117*** (0.0305)	0.00415 (0.0373)	-0.0562 (0.0289)	-0.0199 (0.0295)	0.00535 (0.0247)	-0.0314 (0.0458)	-0.0496 (0.0323)	0.0511 (0.0337)	0.0555* (0.0225)	0.107* (0.0421)	-0.0152 (0.0330)
Prayer Frequency	0.0714*** (0.0146)	-0.0623** (0.0213)	0.0112 (0.0123)	0.0152 (0.0110)	0.0190 (0.0205)	0.0824*** (0.0216)	0.00476 (0.0115)	0.0370 (0.0196)	0.00353 (0.00903)	0.0658* (0.0261)	0.0180 (0.0153)
Enumerator Male	0.00291 (0.0380)	0.0147 (0.0695)	-0.306*** (0.0798)	0.0564 (0.0393)	-0.0328 (0.0379)	0.0166 (0.0483)	0.0317 (0.119)	-0.00883 (0.0505)	-0.140*** (0.0353)	0.579 (0.731)	0.0673 (0.0398)
Enumerator Rel. Appearance	0.0704 (0.0384)	0.0516 (0.0649)	-0.245** (0.0893)	-0.0336 (0.0387)	0.0246 (0.0407)	-0.323*** (0.0450)	-0.393*** (0.0855)	-0.0846 (0.0478)	0.190*** (0.0325)	0.336*** (0.0673)	
Constant	2.096*** (0.128)	3.066*** (0.146)	3.251*** (0.149)	3.134*** (0.115)	2.746*** (0.148)	2.556*** (0.182)	3.288*** (0.149)	2.334*** (0.178)	2.443*** (0.102)	1.755*** (0.219)	2.858*** (0.123)
Observations	1887	2008	2287	2285	1677	1593	1298	1356	1966	2085	2242
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.051	0.024	0.009	0.008	0.001	0.056	0.034	0.015	0.055	0.032	0.006

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table A5.** By Country: Specification 2 (Perceptions of Shari'a (Index) and Support for Democracy)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Palestine	Sudan	Tunisia	Yemen	Iraq
Provides Index	0.285*** (0.0383)	0.185*** (0.0505)	0.00435 (0.0304)	0.0791 (0.0514)	0.106** (0.0373)	0.0180 (0.0481)	0.0647 (0.0434)	0.171*** (0.0482)	0.147*** (0.0314)	0.393*** (0.0381)	-0.0108 (0.0376)
Imposes Index	0.0468 (0.0360)	-0.0812* (0.0377)	-0.0424 (0.0289)	-0.0373 (0.0461)	-0.132*** (0.0370)	-0.0397 (0.0427)	0.00593 (0.0482)	0.0847* (0.0415)	-0.0270 (0.0336)	-0.270*** (0.0386)	-0.0198 (0.0339)
Age	0.0000632 (0.00207)	-0.00122 (0.00282)	0.000841 (0.00165)	-0.00407 (0.00274)	-0.000213 (0.00213)	-0.00364 (0.00300)	0.000617 (0.00202)	-0.0000730 (0.00353)	0.00542** (0.00185)	0.00390 (0.00269)	0.00317 (0.00211)
Male	0.0366 (0.0520)	-0.124 (0.0632)	0.0566 (0.0508)	-0.0418 (0.0704)	-0.0639 (0.0599)	0.00692 (0.0769)	-0.161* (0.0664)	-0.0143 (0.0656)	-0.00768 (0.0579)	0.501 (0.970)	-0.169** (0.0600)
Education	0.0607*** (0.0150)	0.0139 (0.0197)	0.0409* (0.0165)	-0.0327 (0.0253)	-0.00291 (0.0183)	0.0756** (0.0240)	0.0203 (0.0201)	0.0503* (0.0208)	0.0597*** (0.0165)	0.0403* (0.0181)	0.0266 (0.0175)
Employed	0.0411 (0.0606)	0.117 (0.0705)	0.0322 (0.0544)	-0.109 (0.0713)	-0.0471 (0.0494)	-0.0603 (0.0883)	0.0861 (0.0684)	-0.0161 (0.0713)	0.0906 (0.0545)	0.176* (0.0806)	0.205** (0.0659)
Income Insecure	-0.0159 (0.0324)	0.111** (0.0345)	-0.0140 (0.0253)	0.0396 (0.0425)	-0.00186 (0.0227)	0.0171 (0.0417)	-0.0307 (0.0292)	0.00238 (0.0319)	-0.0260 (0.0253)	-0.0719* (0.0357)	-0.0423 (0.0277)
Married	-0.0712 (0.0751)	0.0627 (0.0836)	0.0480 (0.0614)	0.0797 (0.0951)	-0.0363 (0.0712)	0.0142 (0.103)	0.00928 (0.0758)	0.0412 (0.0965)	-0.0120 (0.0661)	-0.132 (0.0818)	-0.0847 (0.0827)
Has Children	0.113 (0.0666)	-0.136 (0.0734)	-0.000459 (0.0549)	0.0780 (0.0919)	0.128 (0.0725)	0.0380 (0.0999)	-0.0585 (0.0648)	-0.128 (0.0928)	0.0462 (0.0627)	-0.104 (0.0800)	-0.00197 (0.0801)
Religiosity	0.0663 (0.0419)	-0.0854 (0.0567)	-0.0378 (0.0413)	-0.122 (0.0661)	0.0369 (0.0340)	-0.0579 (0.0743)	-0.00854 (0.0543)	0.0448 (0.0499)	0.0439 (0.0336)	0.0732 (0.0578)	-0.0145 (0.0472)
Prayer Frequency	0.0658** (0.0207)	-0.0497 (0.0378)	0.0104 (0.0189)	-0.00849 (0.0220)	0.0403 (0.0298)	0.0900** (0.0326)	-0.00551 (0.0234)	0.0457 (0.0292)	0.00857 (0.0133)	0.00316 (0.0348)	0.0179 (0.0218)
Enumerator Male	0.0546 (0.0536)	-0.121 (0.112)	-0.458*** (0.110)	-0.0541 (0.0858)	0.0600 (0.0538)	-0.0594 (0.0738)	0.100 (0.212)	0.0797 (0.0734)	-0.0936 (0.0516)	-0.410 (0.968)	0.0289 (0.0569)
Enumerator Rel. Appearance	0.108* (0.0544)	-0.0140 (0.104)	-0.412*** (0.124)	-0.0129 (0.0680)	0.0582 (0.0581)	-0.242*** (0.0677)	-0.369* (0.171)	-0.0718 (0.0689)	0.153** (0.0484)	0.233** (0.0882)	
Constant	1.176*** (0.207)	3.104*** (0.302)	3.454*** (0.240)	3.448*** (0.315)	2.574*** (0.246)	2.726*** (0.330)	3.194*** (0.286)	1.649*** (0.305)	2.060*** (0.187)	1.779*** (0.343)	2.966*** (0.223)
Observations	946	875	1134	564	842	735	509	656	951	1056	1138
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.036	0.015	0.019	0.030	0.036	0.023	0.037	0.063	0.154	0.013

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table A6.** By Country: Specification 3 (Support for Shari'a, Perceptions of Shari'a (Index), and Support for Democracy)

	(1) Algeria	(2) Egypt	(3) Jordan	(4) Lebanon	(5) Libya	(6) Morocco	(7) Palestine	(8) Sudan	(9) Tunisia	(10) Yemen	(11) Iraq
Support for sharia as basis of law	0.0382 (0.0267)	-0.0297 (0.0275)	-0.0581** (0.0204)	-0.0415 (0.0362)	0.0157 (0.0188)	-0.0323 (0.0390)	-0.0229 (0.0254)	-0.0169 (0.0290)	0.0107 (0.0208)	-0.0344 (0.0318)	0.00278 (0.0229)
Provides Index	0.272*** (0.0393)	0.195*** (0.0525)	0.0176 (0.0310)	0.0885 (0.0527)	0.0952* (0.0381)	0.0319 (0.0513)	0.0656 (0.0457)	0.180*** (0.0504)	0.137*** (0.0324)	0.403*** (0.0391)	-0.0152 (0.0377)
Imposes Index	0.0390 (0.0365)	-0.0864* (0.0382)	-0.0301 (0.0292)	-0.0306 (0.0471)	-0.123** (0.0375)	-0.0476 (0.0433)	0.0119 (0.0484)	0.0856* (0.0418)	-0.0306 (0.0347)	-0.268*** (0.0388)	-0.0189 (0.0340)
Age	0.0000901 (0.00209)	-0.00101 (0.00285)	0.00129 (0.00167)	-0.00424 (0.00278)	0.000428 (0.00215)	-0.00242 (0.00301)	0.00104 (0.00202)	-0.000143 (0.00354)	0.00539** (0.00192)	0.00398 (0.00270)	0.00315 (0.00212)
Male	0.0382 (0.0525)	-0.132* (0.0637)	0.0561 (0.0510)	-0.0365 (0.0720)	-0.0916 (0.0612)	-0.0130 (0.0771)	-0.136* (0.0671)	-0.0119 (0.0658)	-0.00840 (0.0596)	0.528 (0.970)	-0.178** (0.0603)
Education	0.0584*** (0.0151)	0.0128 (0.0200)	0.0466** (0.0167)	-0.0357 (0.0258)	-0.00601 (0.0185)	0.0752** (0.0242)	0.0268 (0.0203)	0.0496* (0.0208)	0.0553** (0.0173)	0.0418* (0.0181)	0.0274 (0.0176)
Employed	0.0327 (0.0608)	0.114 (0.0715)	0.0292 (0.0548)	-0.0958 (0.0726)	-0.0405 (0.0502)	-0.0366 (0.0889)	0.0650 (0.0691)	-0.0157 (0.0715)	0.104 (0.0559)	0.179* (0.0806)	0.208** (0.0661)
Income Insecure	-0.00802 (0.0327)	0.116*** (0.0349)	-0.0157 (0.0254)	0.0425 (0.0434)	-0.00803 (0.0230)	0.0278 (0.0428)	-0.0316 (0.0293)	-0.00126 (0.0322)	-0.0312 (0.0263)	-0.0730* (0.0357)	-0.0415 (0.0279)
Married	-0.0937 (0.0762)	0.0721 (0.0842)	0.0384 (0.0619)	0.0965 (0.0976)	-0.0463 (0.0726)	-0.0156 (0.104)	0.000169 (0.0759)	0.0393 (0.0966)	-0.0162 (0.0683)	-0.140 (0.0819)	-0.0779 (0.0829)
Has Children	0.121 (0.0675)	-0.136 (0.0739)	0.0104 (0.0554)	0.0735 (0.0937)	0.131 (0.0736)	0.0340 (0.100)	-0.0422 (0.0649)	-0.137 (0.0931)	0.0504 (0.0643)	-0.0907 (0.0803)	-0.00431 (0.0801)
Religiosity	0.0578 (0.0438)	-0.0696 (0.0586)	-0.0316 (0.0418)	-0.126 (0.0677)	0.0196 (0.0348)	-0.0371 (0.0790)	0.00958 (0.0549)	0.0501 (0.0502)	0.0455 (0.0347)	0.0833 (0.0583)	-0.0110 (0.0474)
Prayer Frequency	0.0703*** (0.0209)	-0.0479 (0.0387)	0.0154 (0.0191)	-0.0149 (0.0224)	0.0482 (0.0300)	0.0856** (0.0327)	-0.00334 (0.0234)	0.0472 (0.0293)	0.00718 (0.0136)	0.00846 (0.0356)	0.0158 (0.0220)
Enumerator Male	0.0569 (0.0540)	-0.125 (0.112)	-0.480*** (0.113)	-0.0394 (0.0885)	0.0540 (0.0543)	-0.0426 (0.0740)	0.0944 (0.211)	0.0902 (0.0743)	-0.0838 (0.0531)	-0.442 (0.968)	0.0303 (0.0571)
Enumerator Rel. Appearance	0.0970 (0.0547)	-0.0290 (0.105)	-0.434*** (0.127)	-0.00962 (0.0694)	0.0380 (0.0589)	-0.234*** (0.0683)	-0.367* (0.170)	-0.0702 (0.0691)	0.143** (0.0499)	0.235** (0.0883)	
Constant	1.099*** (0.214)	3.134*** (0.305)	3.549*** (0.244)	3.543*** (0.327)	2.563*** (0.248)	2.710*** (0.335)	3.165*** (0.288)	1.672*** (0.311)	2.096*** (0.196)	1.820*** (0.347)	2.963*** (0.227)
Observations	925	866	1118	549	822	719	504	653	921	1054	1131
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.035	0.022	0.023	0.028	0.035	0.021	0.038	0.056	0.156	0.013

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Binned Regressions

The table below presents the three specifications presented in Table 2, but using binned data.

**Table A7.** Support for *Shari'a*, Perceptions of *Shari'a* (Binned), and Support for Democracy

	(1) Democracy Support	(2) Democracy Support	(3) Democracy Support
Support for sharia as basis of law	0.00881 (0.00588)		-0.0133 (0.00847)
Low Provides, High Imposes		-0.0225 (0.0366)	-0.0247 (0.0371)
High Provides, Low Imposes		0.226*** (0.0215)	0.233*** (0.0220)
High Provides, High Imposes		0.168*** (0.0287)	0.174*** (0.0290)
Age	0.000504 (0.000507)	0.000523 (0.000714)	0.000723 (0.000721)
Male	-0.0124 (0.0142)	-0.0154 (0.0202)	-0.0186 (0.0204)
Education	0.0298*** (0.00428)	0.0365*** (0.00607)	0.0367*** (0.00612)
Employed	0.0332* (0.0150)	0.0332 (0.0212)	0.0366 (0.0214)
Income Insecure	0.00674 (0.00715)	-0.00107 (0.0101)	-0.00212 (0.0102)
Married	-0.00115 (0.0182)	-0.00957 (0.0254)	-0.0160 (0.0258)
Has Children	0.00639 (0.0165)	0.0102 (0.0232)	0.0126 (0.0235)
Religiosity	0.00891 (0.0109)	0.0104 (0.0153)	0.0137 (0.0157)
Prayer Frequency	0.0283*** (0.00499)	0.0212** (0.00717)	0.0206** (0.00726)
Enumerator Male	-0.0248 (0.0155)	-0.0236 (0.0220)	-0.0159 (0.0222)
Enumerator Rel. Appearance	0.00985 (0.0153)	0.0293 (0.0217)	0.0274 (0.0219)
Constant	2.611*** (0.0476)	2.527*** (0.0664)	2.560*** (0.0699)
Observations	16548	8268	8131
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.042	0.059	0.059

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001