

Online Appendix

How Exiles Mobilize Domestic Dissent

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A Coding of Digital Content

A.1 Coding Rules for Twitter Account Identification

We conducted a multi-step process to identify the nationality, location, and type of the most engaged Twitter accounts (n=100). For nationality, we combed through users' biographies and posts to see if and how they identified themselves as Egyptian, regularly posted information about Egypt, and used Egyptian dialect. For location, we manually collected the top 500 most common self-reported locations in our dataset. This includes people writing "Egypt" in English or Arabic, writing more specific locations like "Alexandria" in English or Arabic, or using the Egyptian flag in their location field. We then used this list to populate the location of users. We also created one large "Not Egypt" category for any user that mentioned a location other than this list. This process produced the location info for about 40% of users who produced tweets mentioning Ali, which is comparable to other datasets of Twitter users as many people provide no or uninterpretable location information (?). For type, we similarly combed through users' biographies and posts to see if and how they identified themselves – i.e., as private citizens, revolutionaries, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, employed by or representative of a media company.

A.2 Coding Rules for Video Transcripts

For each video, please write a brief paragraph 3-4 sentences summarizing the content of the video in English. Pay particular attention to whether the video contains oppositional information (criticizes Sisi or the Egyptian government); coordination information (describes where/when/how to protest); or both. If the video contains oppositional or coordination information, please highlight the sections of the transcript that express this information and mark them with a comment that says "opposition", "coordination", or "both opposition and coordination." Also please mark in the spreadsheet in the "information" column "opposition" if the video contains opposition information, "coordination" if the video contains coordination information, or "both" if it contains both.

A.3 Expert Human Validation of Twitter Content

A native Egyptian Arabic speaker coded a random sample of 1000 tweets containing references to Ali, his hashtags, or protest discourse. 84% of the tweets in our sample expressed anti-regime sentiment, 9.4% contained neutral references or reporting on Ali and the protests, 6% of the tweets expressed pro-regime sentiment, opposing Ali protests, and .06% of tweets in our sample were irrelevant.




Figure A1: Proportion of Validated Tweets Expressing Anti-Regime Sentiment

Anti-Regime Translated Tweet Examples

- #Enough_Sisi We hope that the second spark of the Egyptian revolution will spark and triumph. Democracy must be achieved even if the journey takes a long time. #Mohamed_Ali
- #Leave_O_Sisi, a demonstration against #Sisi #Military_rule #Leave_Sisi #Enough_Sisi #Going_Friday_to_the_square #Tahrir_Square #Sisi_Nakba [Catastrophe]_Egypt #Go_down_you_are_for_one [protest hashtag]
- O God, #Mohammad_Ali will be the next president of #Egypt #Enough_Sisi


A.4 English Translations of Representative Pro- and Anti-Regime Tweets

Pro-Regime Translated Tweet Examples

- #Thank_You_Egyptian_Intelligence_Services #Mo_Ali_Is_A_Traitor_To_His_Homeland #Long_Live_Egypt [pro-Sisi hashtag]
- Campaign to boycott the Mohamed Ali hashtags and Brotherhood pages. It is forbidden to respond to any Brotherhood page. It is forbidden to post a hashtag against the country. Any tweet you write, write the hashtag to support Egypt, and unify the hashtags
- #We're_all_with_Sisi #Thank_God_for_safety_O_President #Our_mandate_to_Sisi_again #We're_with_you_President #No_to_chaos #Thanks_Egyptian_people_army_police #Mo_Ali_Is_A_Traitor_To_His_Homeland

B Network Visualizations

A. Nationality



B. Actor Type




Figure A2: **Most Frequent Twitter Engagers of Ali's Content (September-November 2019)**. Each network graph shows the top 100 users that most often retweeted or mentioned the @MohamedSecrets account. Nodes are Twitter accounts and edges are retweets or replies to Ali. Nodes are sized by frequency of engagement. Users are then manually coded according to whether they Egyptian or not (A), as well as by actor type (B). Black nodes lacked sufficient information to classify.

C K-Core Decomposition




Figure A3: **Core vs. Peripheral Amplifiers of Ali** This plot displays the proportion of users inside vs. outside of Egypt at the core of the network (most influential users) and at the periphery of the network (least influential users). Cores are calculated using K-core decomposition, with core 1 representing the most peripheral users and core 18 representing the most connected users within the network.




Figure A4: **Core vs. Peripheral Amplifiers of Ali** This plot displays the number of users inside vs. outside of Egypt at the core of the network (most influential users) and at the periphery of the network (least influential users). Cores are calculated using K-core decomposition, with core 1 representing the most peripheral users and core 18 representing the most connected users within the network.

D Facebook Content Analysis




Figure A5: **Daily Volume of Posts Referencing Dissent (September-November 2019)**. This plot displays the daily volume of posts containing a reference to Mo Ali or anti-regime mobilization hashtags produced by page administrators inside and outside of Egypt. These public Facebook data were collected using the Crowdtangle API.

E Google Search Interest within Egypt

Table A1: **Daily Relative Search Interest by City** Google trends data was collected using the Google Trends API. Trends data offers a relative measure of salience, ranging from 0-100, which 100 representing the top salience by city.

	city	governorate	relative search interest
1	Damanhour	Beheira Governorate	100
2	Tanta	Gharbiyya Governorate	94
3	Port Said	Port Said Governorate	87
4	Alexandria	Alexandria Governorate	86
5	6th of October City	Giza Governorate	86
6	Giza	Giza Governorate	79
7	Mansoura	Dakahlia Governorate	76
8	Ismailia	Ismailia Governorate	75
9	Cairo	Cairo Governorate	74
10	New Cairo City	Cairo Governorate	73
11	El Obour City	Qalyubia Governorate	69

F Offline Protest

While establishing a causal link between exiles' online mobilization and domestic offline protest is beyond the scope of this paper, an examination of offline protest demonstrates how anti-regime mobilization re-mobilized previously aggrieved populations.

To assess whether online domestic mobilization was occurring in areas where protests had previously been mobilized, we rely on protest data from Daftar Ahwal, a Cairo-based open-source data collection institute.¹ Recent research suggests that in-country and in-language protest data sources are much more accurate for the MENA region than those compiled using English-language sources (?). The data documents daily protests by protest type.

Daftar Ahwal data measuring political protests between 2011 and 2020 demonstrate that governorates in which protests were recorded between September and November 2019 ($n=15$) were more likely to have previously witnessed protest than those governorates in which protests were not recorded between September and November 2019 ($n=12$), demonstrated in Figure A6. While there are certainly previous protests recorded in governorates without protest between September and November 2019, it is at a much lower frequency than in districts in which protests did occur in late 2019. Thus, districts with protests in 2019 are protest hotspots, where significant opposition to the regime was previously mobilized.




Figure A6: Previous Protest in Districts With and Without Protest in September 2019

Between September 1 and November 1, 2019, there was significant sub-national variation in the number of political protests that occurred, according to contentious event data from Daftar Ahwal. A

¹ See <https://daftarahwal.com/>.

number of governorates saw no protests. The highest number of protests were recorded in Cairo (10), followed by Giza (5), and Suez (4).

Table A2: Political Protests by Governorate (September-November 2019)

Governorate	Number of Political Protests
Cairo	10
Giza	5
Suez	4
Alexandria	3
Damietta	3
Gharbiyya	3
Luxor	2
Port Said	2
Qena	2
Beheira	1
Dakahlia	1
Kafr El-Sheikh	1
Menoufia	1
Minya	1
Sharqiyya	1
Assiut	0
Aswan	0
Beni Suef	0
Fayoum	0
Ismailia	0
Marsa Matrouh	0
New Valley	0
North Sinai	0
Qalyubia	0
Red Sea	0
Sohag	0
South Sinai	0

G Mobilizational Tweets by Governorate

Table A3: Number of Local Mobilization Tweets by Governorate

Governorate	Number of Mobilization Tweets
Suez	36015
Qena	32157
Cairo	19271
Damietta	5096
Port Said	4474
Matruh	2781
Luxor	2729
Sohag	2500
Giza	2451
Alexandria	2186
Gharbiyya	1307
Qalyubiyya	1297
Monufiyya	1285
Aswan	605
Beheira	486
Minya	290
Sharqiyya	170
Fayoum	66
Assuit	58
Ismailia	33
Dakahlia	6
Beni Suef	1